



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**GERMANIA QUO VADIS?: DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN
GERMAN SECURITY POLICY**

by

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June 2007

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE June 2007	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Germania Quo Vadis?: Dynamics of Change in German Security Policy			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S)				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) <p>This study analyzes the essence of FRG security and defense policy after reunification. The first section briefly explains the different theoretical approaches to cooperation of nation states. The second chapter describes German security policy during the Cold War and shows the force of continuity that Germany always preferred the security of NATO. The third chapter explains the German security policy after the Cold War til 1998 and the advent of the Red-Green coalition. Theoretically Germany had the opportunity after regaining total sovereignty to decide between NATO and EU, or even a unequely all-German security strategy. This development of the Kohl administration is then compared with the Schroeder cabinet of 1998-2005.</p> <p>The last chapter describes the strategic and operational capabilities of the German armed forces in order to demonstrate that a German-only path is an unrealistic option, and that Germany is dependent on a deep integration into NATO and the European Union (EU). Finally, the role of German society is investigated in order to determine its influence on the choice to pursue a more independent European security structure; that was not only the result of the Schroeder administration but a result of political demand of the German society as well.</p>				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Germany, Security, Nato, Esdp, German Defense Policy			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 91	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

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POLICY**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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The last chapter describes the strategic and operational capabilities of the German armed forces in order to demonstrate that a German-only path is an unrealistic option, and that Germany is dependent on a deep integration into NATO and the European Union (EU). Finally, the role of German society is investigated in order to determine its influence on the choice to pursue a more independent European security structure; that was not only the result of the Schroeder administration but a result of political demand of the German society as well.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thank you to everybody making this a unique experience.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study analyzes the essence of FRG security and defense policy after reunification. The first section briefly explains the different theoretical approaches to cooperation of nation states. The second chapter describes German security policy during the Cold War and shows the force of continuity that Germany always preferred the security of NATO. The third chapter explains the German security policy after the Cold War til 1998 and the advent of the Red-Green coalition. Theoretically Germany had the opportunity after regaining total sovereignty to decide between NATO and EU, or even a unequely all-German security strategy. This development of the Kohl administration is then compared with the Schroeder cabinet of 1998-2005.

The last chapter describes the strategic and operational capabilities of the German armed forces in order to demonstrate that a German-only path is an unrealistic option, and that Germany is dependent on a deep integration into NATO and the European Union (EU). Finally, the role of German society is investigated in order to determine its influence on the choice to pursue a more independent European security structure; that was not only the result of the Schroeder administration but a result of political demand of the German society as well.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS

This study treats the evolution of German foreign and security policy in the past two decades after reunification in 1990 with reference to contemporary history and international relations theory. As such, this study analyzes the essence of FRG security and defense policy in the past in an effort to comprehend the chronology, causes and effects of change in German security policy in a time of a diplomatic revolution in Europe and the revival of war in the international system in the past twenty years. The first section briefly explains the different theoretical approaches to cooperation of nation states in the international system. The following second chapter describes German security policy during the Cold War and shows the force of continuity that Germany always preferred the security of NATO rather than a European development led by France. This chapter also reveals that NATO security during the Cold War was in fact security provided by the hegemonic leadership of the United States of America (U.S.) and the cooperation of the allies who benefited from this system. In addition, the second chapter shows how German security policy emancipated itself from the fetters of the cold war system during the following four decades. During that period, German security policy focused on three main principles. First, German leadership decided to accept security from the U.S. in order to be safe against any Soviet threat. A second priority was integration into the western society of democratic states in order to regain influence as a legitimate European state, which could only be achieved by reconciliation with France. The last issue was to achieve the reunification of the two German states under democratic conditions and a kind of balance between Adenauer's western integration/roll back ideal of the late 1940's and the détente imperatives of Willy Brandt in the late 1960's. These factors of policy operated to best effect in 1989-1991, but have become more problematic in the recent past. This study seeks to analyze the forces of such change.

The third chapter explains the German security policy after the Cold War til 1998 and the advent of the Red-Green coalition. By 1990 all the above mentioned issues of

policy were solved and Germany had emerged as the economically strongest and largest in population among European countries. Theoretically Germany had the opportunity after regaining total sovereignty to decide between NATO and EU, or even an unequal all-German security strategy. This development of the Kohl administration is then compared with the last chapter, the Schroeder cabinet of 1998-2005.

This third chapter investigates the extent to which the European and the NATO security pillar developed, and German reactions during this social democratic time--continuity or structural change after reunification on one hand and differences in the political parties on the other hand as all these apply to German foreign, security and defense policies.

The last chapter describes the strategic and operational capabilities of the German armed forces in order to demonstrate that a German-only path is an unrealistic option, and that Germany is dependent on a deep integration into NATO and the European Union (EU). Finally, the role of German society is investigated in order to determine its influence on the choice to pursue a more independent European security structure; that the decision to develop security with EU was not only the result of the Schroeder administration but a result of political demand of the German society as well.

B. THE NEOREALIST AND THE NEOINSTITUTIONALIST THEORY

From a theoretical point of view, two scholarly analyses investigate cooperation and integration policy of states. First, the neorealist point of view will be investigated in order to explain the probable result which should have occurred after the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Second, the neo liberal point of view will be explained in order to make assumptions how Germany under this theory should have developed in the post Cold War period. Both theories, therefore, will provide the basic foundation for the two possible paths after 1990: the one which favors NATO and therefore maintenance of U.S. influence; the second, a more European security dimension due to the lack of threat which only could be countered by the U.S. The third and last option would be a re-nationalization which would provide Germany with the most actionable liberty in foreign affairs but might restrain its influence on other states within NATO and/or the EU.

From the neorealist perspective states are the only relevant actors in an anarchic system. Due to the lack of any overarching structure which rules and regulates states' behavior the states live in a self-help system. This system is based on the idea that states have to concentrate on power and security to ensure their sovereignty and integrity. Society, economy, and administration do not play a relevant role due to the fact that only external factors influence state behavior.¹ The external factor of influence is mainly power in a military sense. Therefore states are in a constant rivalry to gain power to ensure their own survival. This pursuit for power is seen as a zero sum game, where the gains of one state are always at the expense of another. Due to the fact that no state can be sure about the intentions of the other states all live in a security dilemma. This forces states to build alliances in order to compensate their lack of security in the form of power. In the situation of NATO, the U.S. is the hegemonic power with overwhelming capabilities. But this hegemony only accepts this situation as long as its relative costs for cooperation are less than its relative gains in this alliance. During the Cold War the U.S. national interest needed the European territory as a security buffer and as a territory for own nuclear and conventional forces for any possible Soviet attack. The current EU countries and especially Germany were the frontline of the Cold War. For Germany, the situation after the Second World War as a defeated country required two security goals: first, to receive security under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and second, to be integrated into the western societies in order to regain political legitimacy as a political actor. From a realist point of view the collapse of the Soviet Union with which the Soviet threat ceased to exist, and the democratization of former communist countries to Germany's east would change Germany's requirement for outside security as well as unconditional integration. With the democratization of former communist countries east of Germany it would gain a security buffer to its eastern border, and the Soviet/Russian threat was not only weakened by the collapse of its empire but now physically further removed from German territory.

¹ Neorealist school: Hans J Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, brief edition (revised by Kenneth Thompson, Mac Graw-Hill, 1985; chapter originally drafted for 2nd ed., 1954), ch.1: "A Realist Theory of International Politics"; Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (New York 1979): Chapter 5-6.

The neo-institutional perspective adopts some parts from the neorealist school but differs in its assumption about state behavior. It acknowledges that interdependence in a more and more globalized world can not be managed by one state itself. Therefore all states which are part of an alliance can be better off because they are able to make relative gains in an alliance. This is contrary to the idea of the neorealist school where only zero sum gains exist. However, from a neo-institutional perspective, all can be better off even without a hegemon because they form an alliance in order to combine their capabilities in order to maximize their influence. Furthermore, the security dilemma gets reduced by the fact that their cooperation is trust-building. It enhances transparency, provides information about the aims of the member states, and therefore makes the alliance durable as long as the members share the same interests and the cost / benefit analysis is positive.²

Germany is left with a difficult question: how far to support EU development as an institution with an own identity running on its own steam, and which might once replace NATO?

² Neoinstitutionalist school: Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, (Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 78-109; Robert O. Keohane, "Institutional Theory in international Relations," in Michael Brecher and Frank Harveys, eds., *Millennial Reflections on International Studies* (University of Michigan Press, 2002).

II. GERMAN SECURITY DURING THE COLD WAR

A. REAPPRAISAL OF THE GERMAN PROBLEM

The way Germany developed after the Cold War was mainly defined by the United States of America (U.S.). Therefore the relationship between Germany and its neighbors and later towards NATO is often a question of the relationship towards the U.S. The United States of America became not only an occupying force after the Second World War but also the main pillar for Western Germany's security. This policy first unfolded before entry into NATO in 1955 and later, as an integral part of NATO until the climax of unity in 1990. A cultural similarity linked both states together. Since 1683, more than seven million Germans migrated into the United States, and nearly one fourth of U.S. citizens of today are of German heritage. In addition, and surely more important for this analysis, more than 16 million U.S. military personnel served in Germany during the Cold War of whom Elvis Presley is perhaps the most famous and the most indicative of the virtues of this fact.³ However, the U.S.'s postwar relationship with Germany began under the hard terms⁴ of occupation, which after a year and a half months changed due to the different policies of the four occupying nations. The Marshall Plan of 1947 and the new cooperation directive JCS 1779 both marked the beginning of a new relationship between the U.S. and Germany that led steadily from hostility to entente.⁵

A further change could be recognized by the telegram of George F. Kennan in February of 1946. Containment of the totalitarian ideology of communism was the necessary center of gravity which finally made the division of Germany necessary but also brought Germans and Americans together in a common purpose. As Kennan stated "...dividing Germany was not an end in itself, it was the only way to prevent the

³ Gregor Schild, "Deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen," *Information zur politischen Bildung* (2003): 3.

⁴ JCS 1067, the fraternization ban conveying the message of collective guilt to Germans and serving as a security measure for the remainder of the war. Petra Goedde, *GI's and Germans. Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945-1949* (Yale University Press, 2003), 43.

⁵ JCS 1779 emphasized German American cooperation and economic reconstruction. In: Petra Goedde, *GI's and Germans. Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945-1949* (Yale University Press, 2003), 124.

Russians from controlling all of Germany at the time.”⁶ German reunification was postponed perhaps forever at the expense of security on one hand and for the integration of West Germany into the Euro-Atlantic sphere on the other hand. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer as the leader of the Christian Democratic Union accepted this U.S. lead development and supported the unconditional integration into the west despite objections of the other political figures intent on the maintenance of unity and the return to the policies of the past.⁷ In April 1948 the European Recovery Program supported the economic reconstruction of West Germany; it was the helping hand of the U.S. which reached out to Germany in order to end the isolation of West Germany in western Europe, and to end the contraction of German industry. West Germany had to be returned to economic strength because France, Denmark and other western European states were dependent on a strong economic West Germany, which functioned as the center of gravity for western European states economies and for the U.S. in mainly military issues.⁸ The Soviet response was the Berlin blockade in June 1948 which made it more than obvious that a new era of east-west confrontation had begun. The Berlin blockade tried to force the western occupation forces out of Berlin so that the Soviet Union could have total control of the eastern part of Germany. Again it was the U.S. *Luftbruecke* or airlift of President Truman which fashioned the umbilical cord between the western democratic state and the small outpost of Berlin. For more than one year Berlin was dependent on this airlift. West Germany unarmed and still almost wholly in ruins left behind the authoritarian system of the Third Reich. West Germany was weak, and still an outcast among its European neighbors. Reconciliation on the basis of common values was the other issue for the West German administration that was of major importance, especially this principle was central to relations across the Rhine, for traditionally France, which had suffered more than any other country under the German pursuit for world power during the First and Second World Wars. “Not security with, but security against,

⁶ John Lamberton Harper, *American Visions of Europe* (Cambridge University Press, paperback Edition 1996), 207.

⁷ “Adenauer’s primary aim was to integrate West Germany institutionally with the political West.” Dan, Dinner, *America in the eyes of the Germans* (Frankfurt: Vito von Eichborn Verlag, 1993), 115.

⁸ Tony Judt, *Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945* (New York: Penguin Books USA, 2006), 98.

a future Germany was the main issue of the western states.”⁹ For the German administration reconciliation with France, unconditional west-integration under U.S. leadership and reunification of Germany were the main issues which they hoped to tackle. FRG statecraft thus had to form a triangular relationship between the West German state, the US and the French IV Republic. Such statecraft was never especially easy, but it was efficacious. This fact bears keeping in mind in view of the events prior to 1990, as well as those thereafter and especially those of the more recent past.

When in June 1950 the communist North Korea attacked the South, the U.S. administration intensified its semi-thought through plans to rearm Germany, a move that alarmed the French and anticipated ongoing Soviet efforts in their eastern zone of occupation to create an armed force there. “The United States could not fight a war against the USSR in Europe without the cooperation of its allies, who provided the real estate from which the war would be launched. The newly formed NATO could only poorly hold any position on the European continent without a defensive line farther to the east. This fact was particularly true for West Germany, which, as the front-line state and the main theater of a potential east-west war, had to permit use of its territory for NATO purposes.”¹⁰ Korea was a shock to the west, and the rearmament of West Germany became necessary to share the burden of a secure Europe. However, the West German society after the years of the Second World War was exhausted and tired of any military attempt, and projected a mentality of “without me.” West Germans were more interested in “...getting real estate rather than participating in any bloody global adventures again.”¹¹ Or they simply wished to live in peace and to have a full stomach and an intact family. But besides this mood Germans feared the Russian threat and the anti communism of the pre-1945 era sensibly extended into the 1950. The weight of the past was insurmountable. Germans had twice carried war to Russia, although Russia had invaded in 1914. As the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union declined, the

⁹ Christian Hacke, *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von Konrad Adenauer bis Gerhard Schroeder* (Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 2004, Second Edition), 66.

¹⁰ Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among democracies, The European Influence on US foreign policy* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 23

¹¹ Harald Steffahn, *Helmut Schmidt*. (Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag, 2004), 66.

transatlantic relationship between Germany and the U.S. grew proportionately better and more important and central to the purpose of Federal German statecraft and strategy. The foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 and the abolishment of the western occupation charter or *Besatzungsstatut* in 1955 marked the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War era.

The Federal Republic of Germany, a former enemy of the U.S., quickly became an ally in the containment politics of the U.S. against the communist Soviet Union. Unlike the failed statecraft of 1919-1923, the U.S. accepted security responsibility for the future of western and central Europe to prevent the Soviet attempt to spread their totalitarian ideology to the west. West Germany therefore accepted the fact that a reunification could not likely be achieved under democratic conditions or those of alignment with the maritime democracies. At this time the German administration thought that German liberty without reunification would be the only positive possibility at least until some distant time in which the Soviet Union would regurgitate what it had recently engulfed. A reunification without liberty would be the result if West Germany would have turned away from its western allies, and would be reunified as a neutral state (a possibility in 1952) not strong enough to escape the Soviet influence that would have damned the fate of Germany to a neutral Germany's future.¹² Germany was dependent for its own security on a strong transatlantic relationship towards the U.S. as the main power in the western hemisphere. West Germany therefore accepted the price it had to pay. National reunification became more and more unrealistic.

However, the Korean War accelerated and supported the politics of Adenauer. It changed the German willingness to contribute a share in the common western defense, in part responding to the U.S. influence to support France materially and financially, only if France would support a more European development without further hampering the U.S. German policy. This phenomenon reflected the triangular policy of integration of the FRG in the West. Only the influence of the U.S. restrained France's attempt to prevent the West German integration into the west during these years in terms acceptable to a

¹² Christian Hacke, *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von Konrad Adenauer bis Gerhard Schroeder* (Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 2004, Second Edition), 69.

West German population wary of politics generally. . At the time Germany had little influence in foreign politics and could only rely on support from the U.S.¹³ Adenauer and the U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles shared a special relationship, and Adenauer saw the U.S. as the only guarantor for peace and liberty for Germany.¹⁴ With the process of democratization of West Germany, President Harry Truman and thereafter Dwight D. Eisenhower transformed a former enemy with limited democratic experience and a militaristic past into a stable democracy willing to support the ideas of peace and democracy.

Germany in return for U.S. ensured security and economical support affirmed U.S. political and economic dominance. However, as the economic recovery of West Germany progressed, it was less and less willing to accept the position of a subordinate of the U.S. When the U.S. demanded that Germany take a larger share in the financial costs of U.S.-stationed troops in Germany in the late-1950s, Germany only followed this demand after serious pressure from the U.S that grew under the Kennedy administration.. In October 1961 Germany signed the Offset-Treaty by which Germany was compelled to buy weapons for their own forces in the U.S. in order to compensate the balance of payments U.S. deficit that weakened the dollar.

B. INTEGRATION INTO THE WESTERN SECURITY POLICY

The security strategy of the West in the middle 1950s was marked by the idea of massive nuclear retaliation under U.S. hegemony. This strategy changed during the 1960s into flexible response with a major impact on the FRG. Initially, the concept of massive retaliation was intended to counter a Soviet attack whether conventional or nuclear, with a massive counter attack with nuclear weapons. The Bundeswehr had adapted to this principle after the Truman administration's ideal of a massive conventional and nuclear build up had become obsolete with the Korean War. The following concept of flexible

¹³ Christian Hacke, *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von Konrad Adenauer bis Gerhard Schroeder* (Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 2004, Second Edition), 67.

¹⁴ Gregor Schild, "Deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen," *Information zur politischen Bildung* (2003): 7.

response (1961-1991) was based on the idea to react with means similar to the attack of the Soviet Union at which ever level of force was appropriate.

Both strategies put West and East Germany in a difficult position as the chief battle field. West Germany was dependent on the nuclear protection of the United States, and any kind of war could have caused the destruction of the western as well as the eastern German territory. Therefore two mains issues were of main importance for West Germany in NATO. First, that a war would have to be avoided by credible deterrence and second, that everything should be done to avoid any decoupling of the U.S. from Europe such that central Europe was nothing more than a shooting range. Otherwise a nuclear war of the superpowers on German territory might have been possible.

The U.S. administration during the 1940s was in the favorable position to be the only ones with nuclear weapons. This fact finally changed at the end of the 1940's but did not change the U.S. strategy to counter the Soviet threat put in hand with NSC-68. A similar deterrence with conventional capabilities was unaffordable due to its high costs. In the mid-1950s the Eisenhower administration reinforced the nuclear arsenal with 7000 tactical nuclear weapons in Germany and flirted with the idea of a sharp reduction of US troops in Europe.¹⁵

The Berlin crisis in 1961 finally showed that the two superpowers were satisfied with the *status quo* and made the way for the operationalization of Flexible Response on a NATO-wide scale, with considerable implications for the FRG. The building of the Berlin wall made it obvious that a frontal attack by the Soviet Union was less probable. However, an adjustment of the western strategy had to be made because the politics of the Soviet Union placed a high value on making life as hard as possible for the western states. The U.S. acceptance of the demarcation between the western and the eastern block changed the NATO strategy of massive retaliation into flexible response, and made any German hope for reunification seemingly impossible. Security and stability seemed to be more important than the question of any German reunification. Adenauer's proposal to the German people that the unconditional link with the west would finally lead to the

¹⁵ Gregor Schild, "Deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen," Information zur politischen Bildung (2003): 8.

reunification proved to be far away at this time. However, West Germany accepted the diminished possibility of reunification, because any possible reunification would not have been achieved under democratic circumstances. These events ushered in the openings of diplomacy of the middle -1960s that later became known as the Ostpolitik (i.e. eastern policy) of the social liberal era, 1969-1982.

The fear of a possible nuclear attack by the Soviet Union decreased. But many Germans felt that flexible response would invite a Soviet attack on German soil because of its lack of deterrence. The Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss adhered to this view, as did the elderly Adenauer. With the Berlin Wall established a *status quo* was built where only a political solution could avoid future war. Security and stability became the most admired aims for the west. Making an issue of German reunification might have destabilized this status quo and therefore was not of major concern to the western powers. Adenauer had to accept that his unconditional link to the west leading to the reunification of both German states had been diminished. West Germany had to accept its dependence on the U.S. and therefore could not expect any support for its pursuit of one German state. The strong transatlantic link forced and supported by Adenauer's policy became the obstacle to any solution of the German problem of reunification. "The Wall ended Berlin's career as the crisis zone of world and European affairs. ...After November 1961 Berlin ceased to matter and West Berlin began its steady descent into political irrelevance."¹⁶

One year after the construction of the Berlin Wall the second major crisis of the Cold War appeared, when the Soviet Union began establishing intermediate ballistic missiles in Cuba. After a sea-blockade of the U.S. and secret bargaining the Soviet Union finally withdrew their nuclear arsenal. The German chancellor Adenauer supported the U.S. when he stated that "we should consider all possible actions for elimination of Castro regime and Soviet influence in Cuba...."¹⁷ Adenauer was willing to put Berlin at stake for the maintenance of western security. Both superpowers had finally agreed on

¹⁶ Tony Judt, *Postwar Europe. A History of Europe Since 1945* (New York: Penguin Books Ltd., 2006), 254.

¹⁷ Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among Democracies. The European Influence on US Foreign Policy*. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 158.

their spheres of influence and respected the marked territory. Stabilization rather than change became the main issue of the U.S. The riots in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1953, in Poland in 1956, in Hungary 1956, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 did not result in a U.S. riposte in central Europe that would interfere with the Soviet *status quo*. In June 1963 the Soviet Union and the U.S. established a hot-line, and one month later signed the test-ban treaty which besides other objectives prohibited any German pursuit of nuclear arms. "The West Germans somewhat resentfully accepted the veto on German nuclear arms, just as they had accepted the division of Berlin, as the price of a continued American presence."¹⁸ The situation between the two major powers in Europe, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, became static and remained so until the late-1970s.

This state of affairs did not support the solution of the German problem of reunification but led to the beginning of the *Entspannungspolitik* or eased relations between the west and the east in the early 1960s. Germany became more emancipated in its foreign policy, a result of the American change in foreign policy which became less centered on Europe. After the situation in Europe became more stable the U.S. turned their main interest to Asia. The U.S. thought that their reliability in Europe as a democratic ally would decrease if they would not support South Vietnam against the communist North. In the process Europe and especially Germany had lost its position as the center of gravity. Security for West Germany was provided by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, Germany was integrated into the NATO structure in 1955 and began to arm in 1956, and reconciliation with France was a long term process which began in the early 1950s and was finally signed in 1963 with the Élysée Treaty. The German pursuit for reunification had become an issue only for West Germany and lost much of its force. The planning staff in the inner-German ministry stopped work for such reunification in 1966 in the spirit of the times.

In 1969 the period of conservative administrations of Konrad Adenauer¹⁹, Ludwig Erhard²⁰, and Kurt Georg Kiesinger²¹ was succeeded by the first Social-liberal

¹⁸ Tony Judt, *Postwar Europe. A History of Europe Since 1945* (New York: Penguin Books Ltd., 2006), 255.

administration of Chancellor Willy Brandt and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel. Brandt and his Foreign Minister Scheel feared that the Hallstein Doctrine²², (i.e. that the FRG was the only legitimate German state and any nation that recognized the GDR would cease to have diplomatic relations with Bonn,) would isolate West Germany's foreign policy. As the former mayor of Berlin during the time the Berlin Wall was built, –a monument to the pursuit by the two superpowers for stasis in Europe--Brandt was disenchanted by the behaviour the U.S. had shown during 1961 and afterwards. Any future reunification of the two German states had to be initiated by Germans willing to pursue a long term strategy. To achieve this aim he envisioned a change through rapprochement. This was similar to the vision of the former U.S. president John F. Kennedy²³. Brandt envisioned a policy of reconciliation with the east as a comparative part of the west integration which was accomplished by Konrad Adenauer.²⁴ Coexistence should be transferred into a relationship where the west would be affiliated with the east. However, his attempt to ease the German-German relations could only be accomplished by negotiations with the Soviet Union, which caused distrust in the western alliance even though Brandt contributed to the U.S. policy to relieve the stresses in Europe. Brandt declared that the Oder-Neisse border was not open for further discussion. Both politicians Richard Nixon and Willy Brandt preferred the policy of détente. It was the success of the German–U.S. relations which enabled the politics of détente to take form in the treaty of Moscow in August 1970, the Warsaw treaty in December 1970, and the four-power agreement in September 1971. Germany became emancipated and the U.S.

¹⁹ Konrad Adenauer was the first German Chancellor (Conservative) of the Federal Republic of Germany between 1949 to 1963, together with Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano.

²⁰ Ludwig Erhard was the second German Chancellor (Conservative) of the Federal Republic of Germany between 1963 to 1966, together with Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder.

²¹ Kurt Georg Kiesinger was the third German Chancellor (Conservative) of the Federal Republic of Germany between 1966 to 1969, together with Foreign Minister Willy Brandt.

²² The Hallstein Doctrine demanded that West Germany was the legitimate speaker for the whole German territory and neglected the legitimate existence of the German Democratic Republic.

²³ John F. Kennedy, 35. President of the United States of America (Democrat), from 1961 to 1963. Commanding Officer of the Fast Patrol Boat PT 109 in the Pacific during the Second World War.

²⁴ Christian Hacke, *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von Konrad Adenauer bis Gerhard Schroeder* (Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 2004, Second Edition), 153.

administration demanded and supported the attempt for regional responsibility.²⁵ But only after intensive consultations between the western allies and the Federal Republic of Germany, Washington, Paris, and London became aware that *Ostpolitik* had nothing to do with so called Finlandization or restraining allies' interests in German affairs. This German vision was not only a socialist vision of change between the two German states. It was also supported by radical step of the conservative parties in Germany which made the ratification possible by abstention from voting.²⁶ The reference point for this German vision can be found in the idea of *Kulturnation* or cultural nation of common language, culture and history, rather than in any anti-Americanism of the West German parties. That is, the grudging acceptance of the division of Europe also rested on a bipartisan sense of responsibility for Germans in the GDR that argued for the ideal of transformation of policy through a process of *Annäherung*, or drawing closer despite the barbed wire and machine guns of the inner German border. Eventually, with the US – Soviet meetings in 1972, 1973, and 1974 and SALT I on nuclear missiles, both superpowers contractually affirmed the policy of détente.²⁷ The U.S. and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) affirmed the actual borders, especially in Europe, and by doing this superseded the idea of détente. Germany emerged into a position as a mediator of American western European policy. Evidence can be found in the statement of German Foreign Minister Scheel who stated that "... any attempt to organize a Europe against the will of America will not gain German approval."²⁸ By supporting U.S. post war policies, Germany transitioned from a vanquished nation to one of Europe's most important states as an economic and security partner.

Domestic political problems finally overcame Chancellor Willy Brandt and the social democrat Helmut Schmidt became the fifth chancellor of the FRG in 1974.

²⁵ Christian Hacke, *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von Konrad Adenauer bis Gerhard Schroeder* (Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 2004, Second Edition), 173.

²⁶ Christian Hacke, *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von Konrad Adenauer bis Gerhard Schroeder* (Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 2004, Second Edition), 178.

²⁷ Tony Judt, *Postwar Europe. A History of Europe Since 1945* (New York: Penguin Books Ltd., 2006), 501.

²⁸ Christian Hacke, *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von Konrad Adenauer bis Gerhard Schroeder* (Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 2004, Second Edition), 192.

Schmidt was a former German Luftwaffe Officer during the Second World War and a reserve officer of the Bundeswehr, and signified how the SPD had reached out to such men in their millions in the 1950s and also symbolized how the German working class embraced the social market economy. Schmidt also symbolized how the SPD had embraced the Bundeswehr in the 1950s as well. Due to the Soviet rearmament Schmidt believed in the necessity of strong armed forces, which in the German case, should be deeply linked to the transatlantic organization.²⁹ Different from the Jimmy Carter³⁰ administration of 1976-1981 Schmidt envisioned that the Soviet bloc could only be limited under two conditions: first, that a conventional Soviet attack could be successfully stopped at the actual borders, and second, that détente could only work if the Soviets could be convinced that any attack would trigger a counterattack on Soviet soil. For this version of détente to be persuasive, deployment of Pershing II and Cruise Missiles were best suited.³¹ Schmidt saw a huge threat in the rearmament of the Soviet Union, which established more and more Euro-strategic SS-20 Missiles in the GDR which mainly threatened Europe, as the U.S. was out of reach of these medium range missiles. Schmidt argued that the U.S. and Europe should not be decoupled by the Soviet- and U.S. Salt agreement concerning long-range missiles. The U.S. president Jimmy Carter finally moved towards this threat assessment, and the NATO double treaty in 1979 ensured the replacement of Pershing I-A by Pershing II missiles as well as Ground Launched Cruise Missiles. A new equilibrium was achieved when the detente politics of Carter in his first years shifted to a more weapons-dependent security stance in the wake of the Afghan invasion by the Soviets in December 1979. Schmidt was aware that a secure Europe could only be achieved under the U.S.-led NATO, and he was willing to put his own political career at stake in order to station U.S. Pershing and GLCM missiles in Germany.³² Schmidt's attempt to achieve both, a policy of détente and the rearmament

²⁹ Christian Hacke, *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von Konrad Adenauer bis Gerhard Schroeder* (Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 2004, Second Edition), 230.

³⁰ Jimmy Carter, 39th President of the United States of America from 1977-1981.

³¹ Christian Hacke, *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von Konrad Adenauer bis Gerhard Schroeder* (Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 2004, Second Edition), 238.

³² Harald Steffahn, *Helmut Schmidt*. (Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag, 2004), 118.

discussion within NATO (in accord with the Harmel doctrine of 1967), finally weakened the support of his own party by 1982 in addition to problems with the liberal Free Democrats on tax issues. However, Schmidt was right--that any policy of détente was only possible under the condition of a military equilibrium between west and east in accord with NATO policy in hand since the late-1960s.³³

The sixth German Chancellor Helmut Kohl took office in 1982, and the conservative German Chancellor and the conservative U.S. President Ronald Reagan made transatlantic politics slightly easier. However, due to the Vietnam experience and Reagan's nuclear ideas as well as his call to tear down the Berlin Wall (1987), the German people were suspicious of the conservative U.S. president and his aggressive politics, forcing rearmament with Cruise missiles, inter-medium ballistic missiles and the development of the SDI program. Again, as the relationship between the two superpowers weakened, the relationship between West Germany and the U.S. improved. Reagan forced an ideological and economic confrontation with the Soviets. This strategy finally exhausted the Soviet Union and its economic capabilities, and triggered the collapse of the Soviet Union. Reagan's policy of rearmament threatened any solution of the German problem, but it weakened the Soviet Union and finally caused its collapse as the second superpower.

The administration change in the U.S. in 1989 when George Herbert Walker Bush took over from Reagan came at the same time Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev recognized that his policy of Perestroika and Glasnost also made a closer link to the west necessary. Germany was one of the countries where the Soviet Union hoped to find a valuable partner for financial and economic help and trade. This course of open door to the west also had an effect on the GDR, which through improvements in economic well being, liberty, and elements of a democratic system had more and more in common with the west.³⁴

³³ Christian Hacke, *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von Konrad Adenauer bis Gerhard Schroeder* (Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 2004, Second Edition), 261.

³⁴ Christian Hacke, *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von Konrad Adenauer bis Gerhard Schroeder* (Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 2004, Second Edition), 261.

It was the support of the U.S. which finally together with the acceptance of the Soviet Union made reunification possible. France as well as the United Kingdom (UK) feared any German reunification, and tried to oppose or at least to slow down this process, but did not have as weighty a say as the U.S.

C. GERMAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY 'TIL 1989

The creation of the two German states, the FRG and the GDR, was mainly accomplished by the will and terms of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Both states followed the ideological framework of their hegemonic leaders. For both German states the process of reconstruction was without any historical link to former times. The western part of Germany developed under NATO due to the fact that the U.S. was the unconditional leader of NATO during the Cold War, and Germany developed under U.S. leadership. What was unachievable during the Weimar Republic--the pursuit for welfare, economic development, security, and integration in the west--became reality after nearly one decade. Germany evolved in its political behaviour, and besides territorial security, reunification became an issue of high priority. But the Soviet threat to western Germany could only be balanced by NATO, or to be more specific, by a close link to the U.S. as the hegemonic power of the western hemisphere. Reconciliation with France was achieved in the decades which followed the Elysee Treaty. What could not develop during the decades of the Cold War was a national identity. The contrary ideologies of their occupation powers made a common political development for the divided Germanies impossible. Both states were the result of rational power politics and were partly founded to avoid a *Nationalstaat* or national state of its historical heritage. Nationality as national interest is the base of any foreign policy. The period of the Cold War shows that the FRG followed the idea to stay mass and to balance its policy between the two superpowers. The Soviet threat and the U.S. nuclear umbrella constrained the German security policy. Only NATO could provide what was necessary to ensure economic, social, political and cultural development. All these ties became less important after reunification and the full sovereignty that was achieved in 1990-1991. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact opened the gate even wider for a new German

security policy. The framework of German security and defense changed totally. Germany as the heartland of Europe, economically strong and reunified, had achieved its aims of the Cold War, and its geo-strategic situation had turned Germany into the most important country of continental Europe. Being in this situation provided opportunities which were unforeseeable during previous decades. But how has the security and defense of Germany developed since reunification in the past decade and a half? Did it prefer a more European security and defense policy at the expense of NATO, did it renationalize and take a more independent or German way, or did it maintain in linking its security to the long, successful, and reliable security of NATO? The following pages seek answers to these questions.

III. THE KOHL ADMINISTRATION AFTER REUNIFICATION

A. EU OR NATO, CIVILIAN POWER OR *REALPOLITIK*?

With the reunification in October 1990 German Chancellor Helmut Kohl stated that “we know that from now on we [the Germans] have to take over more responsibility in the international community.”³⁵ Only one year later, after Iraq had invaded and occupied Kuwait and the U.S. prepared to operate under a UN resolution to free Kuwait, German Chancellor Kohl stated that “...our American and European allies should know that they are not alone in the fight of the international community to ensure global rights and the enforcement of peace in Kuwait. Germany will strongly support them.”³⁶ This point of view was not only legitimate but also expected by the allies. Germany with more than 80 million citizens and its economic strength was expected to take over more responsibility in military terms in a world that somehow failed to embrace the Kantian ideal in the 1990s.

Would Germany contribute troops and support the UN and the U.S. in an extra national operation when German politicians believed that this was not in congruence with the German Constitution? The anticipated answer came in the form of \$17 billion USD for the US-led war against Iraq in 1991. This political behavior may be traced to the mid 1980s when the German Minister of Justice Juergen Schmude received the order from the German Parliament to rule how far German Armed Forces would be allowed to operate outside the assigned area of NATO even under a UN resolution in light the strictures of the German Basic Law. Schmude stated that any operation outside NATO would be prohibited by the German Constitution’s Article 87a.³⁷ This clause was also the general point of view of the German politicians and reflects that Germany after 1945

³⁵ Helmut Kohl, “Botschaft zum Tag der deutschen Einheit an alle Regierungen der Welt,” *Europa Archiv* Jahrgang 45. (1990): 541.

³⁶ Helmut Kohl, “Regierungserklärung from 01.03.1991, German Parliament, <http://www.phoenix.de/51166.htm>, access 04.01.2007.

³⁷ The Article 87.A. states that German Forces main purpose is defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, any other mission is only allowed if not contrary to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. <http://www.datenschutz-berlin.de/recht/de/gg/>, accessed 04.01.2007

had developed into a civilian power which rejects the idea of *Machtpolitik* and the use of force. This fact was disappointing especially for the U.S., which after German reunification had stated that future German-U.S. cooperation would be characterized as “partners in leadership.”

For national reasons, this “hands-off” stance toward the Middle East conflict did not extend to more local European territorial challenges that emerged around the same time. When the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia collapsed, Slovenia and Croatia pronounced their independence on June 25, 1991. One year after its own reunification Germany was still fully aware of its good fortune and the necessary support from the Soviet Union and the U.S. to achieve this long-wished-for aim, and supported these two small countries in south eastern Europe.³⁸ Their attempt at liberty was abolished by the immediate intervention of the Yugoslavian Army. Interestingly, Germany had acknowledged the general agreement of the EU not to acknowledge any of these states’ attempt for sovereignty before a general regulation could be achieved. Germany was perceived by many European states as choosing its own way. Some European countries feared that this German attempt was the first sign of a German path of power politics without consulting its NATO allies or the EU members.

The reason behind German support for sovereignty in Slovenia and Croatia was an attempt to change the situation of the internal Yugoslavian conflict. Germany hoped by supporting the pursuit for sovereignty to be able to forestall any further attack by Yugoslav military forces. By acknowledging their sovereignty, any further attack would not be an internal political issue but an attack on a sovereign country. However, an agreement with the EU had been achieved well ahead of the German acknowledgment.

This strategy was further fuelled by the German-French attempt to transform the German-French Brigade, commissioned in 1990, into the Eurocorps.³⁹ The bilateral meeting of France and Germany in La Rochelle in May 1992 was an example which

³⁸ Ian Q. R. Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance. NATO and the political imagination*. (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 173.

³⁹ Deutsch Franzoesische Brigade, Brigado Franco Allemande, Auftrag und Geschichte, http://www.df-brigade.de/site_de/indexd1.htm, access 04.02.2007

should have alleviated concern about any unilateral German path or preferred European development. Both France and Germany agreed to transform the German-French brigade into the Euro Corps, which would be suitable for peace-building and peace-securing missions under UN resolutions. Its own military staff was established in Strasbourg in October 1992, and one year later Belgium joined the Eurocorps. This development was criticized especially by Washington because the U.S. feared that these participating countries would step by step disengage from the NATO structure. The transformation of the German-French Brigade should not be mistaken as a sign of a German willingness to prefer a more European defense pillar. It has to be seen as the total opposite. Frictions occurred between France and Germany during the La Rochelle meeting in May 1992 because the former German-French Brigade was neither an integral part of NATO nor had there been any attempt to define its relations towards NATO. German support for the development of a European army was linked to the idea that it would have the effect of bringing France closer to NATO.⁴⁰ Since 1966 France was no longer a member of the Integrated Military Organization (IMO) of NATO, and attempted to loosen Germany's ties towards NATO. Finally France did agree to the establishment of formal links between the Franco-German corps and NATO only with the condition that Germany was not willing to establish a Eurocorps without any link towards NATO. The doubly hated German troops, assigned to NATO as well as to the Eurocorps, are an integral part of the Eurocorps. The Eurocorps itself can be subordinated to the Senior Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) which is always an American officer. In fact, Germany did not loosen its ties towards NATO but induced France to get closer to NATO again. France finally had to acknowledge that after the end of the Cold War NATO survived, and it did so because states like Germany were not willing to develop a single European defense pillar. From that point of view Germany maintained its pursuit for a balanced security policy between NATO and the EU and sought to avoid renationalization.

⁴⁰ Ian Q. R. Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance, NATO and the political imagination* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 172. Also see: Anand Menon, *France, NATO and the limits of independence, 1981-1997*, (New York: St.

Martin's Press Inc., 1999), 144.

In sum, the German administration under Helmut Kohl followed the Adenauer policy of unconditional western security integration with the west. Surely this policy could not be done without France, in general, but even Kohl favored an even closer multilateral integration. During this administration the German armed forces were linked to more bilateral and multilateral forces than ever before in the history of Germany. In October 1992 the NATO Rapid Reaction Corps were established. Its multinational Command Staff was based in Bielefeld in Germany and led by a British general. Besides one British tank division and one light infantry division, two multinational divisions of German, Dutch, Greek, Italian, and Turkish troops would increase the force to a total of nearly 100,000 soldiers. This Corps was established for the territorial defense of NATO but can also be assigned under UN resolution for NATO *out of area* missions.⁴¹

Furthermore, a German-American Corps stationed in Heidelberg, an American-German Corps stationed in Ulm, a German-Dutch Corps in Muenster, and a German-Danish Corps stationed in Rendsburg was established. In addition, Germany remained a member of the NATO Airborne Early Warning System E3A which planes and crews were stationed in Geilenkirchen in Germany.

This development was a decisive point because it abolished any French assumption that after the collapse of the Soviet Union the days of NATO's survival were numbered, and that Germany could finally lean towards a French-led European defense pillar. Re nationalization was in fact not observed in the behavior of Germany but in the behavior of several NATO allies. The U.S. reduced its troops in Europe from 350,000 in 1989 to 100,000 by 1994; most of these divisions had been stationed in Germany.⁴² Canada, without previous consultation of its allies, stated in February 1992 that they would withdraw their troops by 1994.⁴³

⁴¹ Oliver Thraenert, *Aspekte deutscher Sicherheitspolitik in den neunziger Jahren* (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1993), 9.

⁴² Helen Wallace and William Wallace, *Policy-Making in the European Union* (Oxford: University Press, 2000), 471.

⁴³ Jan Willem Hoenig, „The Renationalization of Western European Defense”, *Security Studies* (1992): 122-138.

The strategy for collective self defense of western Europe differed from nation to nation according to the interests of each. The British intent was to use the Western European Union (WEU) for “military actions outside the NATO treaty.”⁴⁴ By this intent the British wanted to develop a mission for the WEU which would be complementary to NATO. France tried to develop a farther reaching goal. France considered the WEU as a fully established political union which as every other political union should take care of its own defense. Therefore the member states of the WEU had to achieve a compromise about the tasks and the integration of the WEU. It had to be a compromise of the euro-skeptical British and the NATO skeptical French. In June 1992 these member states met at the Petersberg in Bonn in order to reactivate the WEU. During this meeting the members agreed that the WEU should develop military capabilities for: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. The military units of the WEU which should execute these tasks should be “employed in conjunction with their contribution to common defense in agreement with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels treaty.”⁴⁵ Furthermore the WEU defined its decision “as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.”⁴⁶ This compromise is congruent with the German attempt that any European development should be complementary to NATO and not diminish NATO into irrelevance. The German Chancellor Helmut Kohl stated, “It is no longer a question of either-or, but of one alongside the other.”⁴⁷

To ensure that any development would be complementary and not a duplication of existing capabilities of NATO, the NATO members decided to develop the Combined Joint Task Force concept (CJTF). This concept “launched in 1993, was designed to allow

⁴⁴ Peter Schmidt, *Partners and Rivals: NATO, WEU, EC and the Reorganization of European Security Policy: Taking Stock*, in: Peter Schmidt (ed.), *In the midst of change: on the development of West European security and defense cooperation* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1992), 218.

⁴⁵ Peter Schmidt, *Partners and Rivals: NATO, WEU, EC and the Reorganization of European Security Policy: Taking Stock*, in: Peter Schmidt (ed.), *In the midst of change: on the development of West European security and defense cooperation* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1992), 219.

⁴⁶ Western European Council of Ministers, *Petersberg Declaration*, Bonn 19. June 1992, Part II, Page 6., <http://www.weu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf>, access: 04.02.2007.

⁴⁷ Ian Q. R. Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance, NATO and the political imagination* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 172.

for NATO-WEU cooperation for Petersberg-type tasks.”⁴⁸ In “1994 – 1996 NATO endorsed steps to build an ESDI that was separable but not separate from NATO to give the European allies the ability to act in crises where NATO as a whole was not engaged.”⁴⁹ Therefore Germany as member of the WEU as well as member of NATO ensures that NATO has a higher priority, and that any decision must first be made within NATO. This complements the fact that if NATO does not agree to execute its own operation it would not override its consensus decision making process to loan assets to the WEU. This shows that the Europeans are dependent on NATO assets for more intensive operation. This ensures U.S. control and avoids any duplication of European assets, which then would constrain the small defense budgets of the European countries.

With the development of the NATO Strategic Concept of 1991, the transatlantic alliance changed to adjust to the new environmental security challenges of the post Cold War era. As NATO had been able to shape the era of the Cold War, the new adjustments should ensure that NATO continues its importance in the global security spectrum. Therefore new tasks were added due to a new threat assessment of the alliance. The Soviet Union was not perceived as a threat, but rather than a risk:

In the particular case of the Soviet Union, the risks and uncertainties that accompany the process of change cannot be seen in isolation from the fact that its conventional forces are significantly larger than those of any other European State and its large nuclear arsenal comparable only with that of the United States. These capabilities have to be taken into account if stability and security in Europe are to be preserved.⁵⁰

By this new concept the NATO members acknowledged that a secure Europe was dependent on the capabilities of the U.S. nuclear and conventional forces. But besides the verification that Russia was transitioning from a country which threatened Europe to a country due to its capabilities is still a risk for Europe. Accordingly, NATO with its Military Document 400 (MC 400) “ceased planning for operations against a clearly

⁴⁸ Paul Cornish, and Geoffrey Edwards, “Beyond the EU/NATO dichotomy: the beginnings of a European strategic culture,” in: *International Affairs*, 77:3 (2001), 590.

⁴⁹ Kristin Archick, NATO and the European Union (CRS Report to Congress, updated 3 Jan., 2006), <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/61468.pdf>, accessed 23 March 2007.

⁵⁰ NATO Ministerial Communiqués, The Alliance New Strategic Concept 1991, Updated: 07 February 2005, <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm>, accessed 04.02.2007

defined adversary and has taken its primary purposes crisis management and promoting international stability, as seen its shift from threat assessment to risk assessment.”⁵¹ Furthermore NATO created Rapid Reaction Forces and the Combined Joint Task Force Project, which were put forward at the January 1994 Brussels summit. This concept allowed NATO “to engage in military actions with other international entities...”⁵² such as the WEU. The creation of Rapid Reaction Forces which are “...smaller, more mobile forces that stood at lower levels of readiness” makes it obvious that future conflicts had to be managed outside of the periphery of central Europe and therefore outside of NATO’s former area of interest. The “...future tasks of the Alliance would not end at the borders of Europe.”⁵³

By affirming this new concept the Germans had acknowledged that they still wished the security provided by the U.S., and that Germany would be willing to contribute and support military actions in regions other than Europe. This promise was proven with the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina that began in 1991. The attempt of the European countries to solve the conflict with soft-power and civilian means failed catastrophically.⁵⁴ Civilized means of the European Union were without any positive effects. Military means were necessary to conduct the embargo operation in the Adriatic Sea. This operation was a close cooperation between the WEU and NATO under a UN Resolution. Germany participated in the NATO Operation Sharp Guard to control

⁵¹ Robert B. McCalla, “NATO’s Persistence after the Cold War,” in: *International Organization*, 50:3 (Summer 1996), 449.

⁵² Robert B. McCalla, “NATO’s Persistence after the Cold War,” in: *International Organization*, 50:3 (Summer 1996), 449.

⁵³ Helga Haftendorn, *Deutsche Aussenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung* (München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2001), 393.

⁵⁴ On the Bosnian war see: Christopher Bennett, *Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse Causes, Course and Consequences*, (New York: New York University Press, 1995); Ivo H. Daalder, *Getting to Dayton: The Making of America’s Bosnia Policy* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000); Dunja Melcic, ed., *Der Jugoslawien-Krieg: Handbuch zu Vorgeschichte, Verlauf und Konsequenzen* (Opladen/Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag GmbH, 1999). On European crisis management see: Mark Almond, *Europe’s Backyard War: The War in the Balkans* (London: Mandarin Paperbacks, 1994); James Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Thomas R. Mockaitis, *Peace Operations and Intrastate Conflict, The Sword or the Olive Branch* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999); Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Wash., D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995).

merchant shipping in order to prevent weapon deliveries to Yugoslavia.⁵⁵ In the following operation Deny Flight, NATO for the first time in its history was engaged in combat which finally forced the Serbs to agree to a cease fire. The Dayton peace agreement of December 1995 was finally enforced by NATO under a UN mandate. Germany agreed to these operations but, due to the constitutional prohibition of using German troops, did not support these operations militarily. The western partners were less and less willing to accept this German behavior, and demanded that Germany share more equally in operations. The use of the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) to enforce the UN Resolution Deny Flight brought up the first discussion about German participation. The fact that these air crews were multinational---therefore dependent on German participation---raised questions in the German Parliament that divided the Kohl cabinet from the opposition parties. It was the opposition of the former conservative administration under Kohl which came under fire. The social democrats and the green party did require a constitutional act of law to allow the German participation.

With the constitutional decision in June 12, 1994 in favor of Article 24 and collective security, Germany was allowed to participate in any multilateral engagements necessary for peace enforcement or peace building.⁵⁶ With this decision the general basics of security policy changed. Germany, always willing to contribute and support by indirect means, from now on could not hide behind the constitutional paragraphs. Indirect help was provided even before this act of law by naval ships, maritime patrol aircraft, logistical operations through the Rhein-Main Airbase, and AWACS crews. No example of direct participation in the Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) ever happened. But Germany supported the following Stabilization Force (SFOR) beginning December 1995. From this date up to the end of the NATO SFOR Mission in December 2004 more

⁵⁵ Sharp Guard was initiated to conduct operations to monitor and enforce compliance with UN sanctions in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) (713, 757, 787, 820 and 943). Its maritime forces, under Combined Task Force 440 (CTF 440) prevented all unauthorised shipping from entering the territorial waters of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and all arms from entering the former Yugoslavia. See: NATO Operation Sharp Guard, <http://www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/SharpGuard/SharpGuardFactSheet.htm>, (accessed April 5, 2007).

⁵⁶ Helga Haftendorn, *Deutsche Aussenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschraenkung und Selbstbehauptung* (Muenchen: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2001), 392.

than 63.500 German soldiers had served in SFOR operations.⁵⁷ The follow-on operation of SFOR, the EUFOR operation which began in December 2004 were deeply integrated into the NATO Headquarters in Sarajevo.

Germany awarded priority to NATO during the time of the Kohl administration as shown above. This fact can be further acknowledged by the change of the French position towards NATO during the mid 1990s. France linked its willingness for further NATO integration with the demand of an Europeanization of NATO. Therefore France demanded to receive “as much weight within the new command structure as the other large European member states...[Britain and Germany].” The U.S. already had “cut its share at the allied military headquarters, where only two of the top twelve generals were American, compared with five or six during the Cold War.”⁵⁸

France linked its reintegration to NATO on two conditions. First, it demanded to receive the command post of the regional command south in Naples, and second, that they would subsequently support the U.S. intent for further NATO enlargement to the east.⁵⁹ The U.S. relied on a U.S.-assigned command post due to the fact that the 6th Fleet of the U.S. Navy was subordinated to the U.S. admiral of the Naples command post. This fleet was responsible for the surveillance of the area not only close to Israel but also for the Suez Canal. From this strategic point Mediterranean shipping into the Persian Gulf can be controlled. Germany first supported Paris’s attempt but became aware of U.S. intentions to reject this French attempt. Therefore Germany made the recommendation for a temporary assignment where the command post would rotate between Europe and the U.S. When this recommendation was rejected by the U.S., however, Germany from

⁵⁷ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, “Einsätze der Bundeswehr im Ausland,” Typo Druck und Design, August 2005, 8.

⁵⁸ Anand Menon, *France, NATO and the limits of independence 1981-97* (New York: St. Martin’s Press Inc.), 56.

⁵⁹ Ronald D. Asmus, *Opening NATO’s Door, How the Alliance remade itself for a new era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 186.

then on took positions that would not cause any tensions with the U.S. leaders in their demand to keep this command posture. After this defeat, France used this U.S. decision to reject any further NATO integration.⁶⁰

B. CONCLUSION

In sum, one can see that Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1982-1998) continued to balance politics between NATO and Europe. But wherever a choice had to be made, Germany favored the U.S.-led NATO security pillar. A Europeanization which loosened its ties towards NATO did not take place in the years after German reunification during the Kohl administration. Just the opposite, because it was Chancellor Kohl who made the decision to entangle the German armed forces in multilateral forces like the American-German Brigade, the German-American Brigade, and the German-Netherlands Brigade. Furthermore Germany tried to entangle France into with NATO again, but this attempt was only partly successful, with the German-Franco Brigade which transitioned to the Eurocorps. Finally France and Germany hammered out an agreement to make this force also available for NATO operations under NATO command. A prioritization of NATO can be acknowledged in so far that Germany in a time of redefinition of its foreign security after reunification always intended to tie any European development to NATO. In times where a decision had to be made for one or the other, Germany favored NATO as we can see in France's demand for the southern command post in Naples. However, some argue that the former German Chancellor Kohl was more an Europeanist, not forgetting that it was him who made the decision for further integration of Germany into NATO as well as supported the U.S. attempt for NATO enlargement when France rejected this idea. During the Kohl administration, therefore, we can see that continuity existed and was favored by the German government. However, after the reunification a political change occurred in 1998 which was underestimated by his administration. For the first time in German history, a socialist-green administration took over and an element of new dynamism as well as uncertainty made itself felt in a European system that had lurched into enduring flux and change.

⁶⁰ Helga Heftendorn, *Deutsche Aussenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung* (Muenchen: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt Stuttgart Muenchen, 2001), 397.

IV. THE SCHROEDER ADMINISTRATION AND NATO-EU DEVELOPMENT, 1998-2005

A. INTRODUCTION

The Schroeder cabinet of a centre left coalition represented a significant phase of change and reorientation in German security and defense policy in the era since 1949. This chapter is divided into two subchapters: the first deals with Germany's influence in the development of NATO, the second with the development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). After the German reunification in 1990 under the administration of Chancellor Helmut Kohl the cabinet change in 1998 was not only a political change, but also a generational change within the politics of German parties. For the first time in the history of Germany a coalition of social democrats and Greens had taken over the responsibility for Germany's security. In addition to the fact that the Green party traditionally rejected any out-of-area missions as well as any integration into NATO, influences of a generational change could be attributed to the fact that for the first time politicians came to office without any experience of the Second World War as well as the experience of the late 1960s as concerns the consolidation and upheaval in the story of German democracy since 1945. This new generation demanded a "new self-confident German foreign policy."⁶¹ Such policy often meant, in practice, the radical questioning of the tenets of statecraft since 1949.

With these facts in mind this chapter investigates how far the Schroeder administration evaluated and supported the development of the ESDP to become a more independent alternative option to NATO. Did this administration continue the policy of integration and multilateralism of its predecessor Helmut Kohl? Thereafter, the following chapter investigates how far the development of NATO was supported by the red-green coalition.⁶² This discussion develops in tandem with the last chapter, which investigates

⁶¹ Stephen F. Szabo, *Parting Ways, the crisis in German-American relations*, (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2004): 122.

⁶² Gerhard Schroeder, 7th President of the Federal Republic of Germany, from 1998-2005.

the German Armed Forces and its development after the Cold War. This enables us to understand that a re nationalization of German foreign security was not a viable option, and links Germany to one or both security pillars. Finally, the opinion of the German society towards its armed forces and the use of force that became regular during this decade is investigated in order to demonstrate that the chosen policy of more European autonomy is not only a political attempt of one party but finds support across the spectrum of German society. This analysis yields two main ideas. First, that a gap is slowly appearing between the administrations' use of the German armed forces and secondly, that the society is more and more identifying itself with a European rather than a transatlantic identity.

B. GERMANY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATO, 1998-2005

During the years of the Kohl administration decisive steps were taken which ensured a close German link to NATO, and showed continuity rather than structural changes in the premises of the German armed forces. The first NATO meeting after the administration change took place in Washington in April 1999, where all NATO members ratified the new NATO Strategic Concept at the time of the Kosovo operation. This document announced the necessary changes which ensured that NATO would be able to meet the new strategic challenges of this time. Germany acknowledged the new “appearance of complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, including oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”⁶³ But besides the acknowledgment of new tasks the importance of the nuclear umbrella provided by the U.S. was especially emphasized by the NATO members.⁶⁴ This fact shows that the threat assessment of the member states changed from a static threat posed by nuclear forces of the Soviet Union to a new challenge of unconventional, even non-state actors which required the transformation of national forces of NATO's member states. This change has to be linked

⁶³ The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, D.C., 23/24 April 1999, Para 3, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>, (accessed 1 March 2007).

⁶⁴ The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, D.C., 23/24 April 1999, Para 62, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>, (accessed 1 March 2007).

to experiences during the years of the Balkan conflict. Two major lessons were drawn by the NATO members: first, that Europe was incapable of handling this conflict on its own and second, that Europe had not made significant progress shifting from static land based forces of the Cold War towards high mobile fast deployable forces. Therefore the allies approved the Defense Capability Initiative at the Washington summit in April 1999. This initiative was designed to:

...improve the defense capabilities of the Alliance to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of Alliance missions in the present and foreseeable security environment with a special focus on improving interoperability among Alliance forces (where applicable also between Alliance and Partner forces). Defense capabilities will be increased through improvements in the deploy-ability and mobility of Alliance forces, their sustainability and logistics, their survivability and effective engagement capability, and command and control and information systems.⁶⁵

This decision ensured a dual track development. Nuclear security would be provided mainly by the U.S., but conventional forces would be transformed into fast deployable and useful assets for peacekeeping missions. Lord Robertson stated that “Kosovo should not be seen as a model for the future. Ideally, the future should be characterized by more prevention and less intervention.”⁶⁶ Therefore a more civilian aspect arrived in the arena of NATO. The identified lack of capabilities was finally addressed in the Prague Capability Commitment (PCC) during the NATO Prague Summit in November 2002. More than 400 single issues got ratified and 42 issue related solution groups were tasked to resolve the development of capabilities which would close the gap between the different members of NATO. Germany participates in 19 groups and is the leader of 6 of these capability groups. Special emphasis is laid on the realm of strategic airlift, combat search and rescue, surveillance and reconnaissance, and precision

⁶⁵ David S. Yost. “The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union,” in: *Survival*, 42:4 (Winter 2000-01), 97-118.

⁶⁶ Yost, David S. “NATO’s Contribution to Conflict Management,” in: Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (eds.), *Turbulent Peace. The Challenges of Managing International Conflict* (Wash., C.D.: United States Institute of Peace, 2nd edition, 2003), 585-602.

guided weapons.⁶⁷ Furthermore NATO decided to establish further rapid response forces. These NATO Response Forces (NRF) would provide 21,000 troops which should be deployable within five days and able to sustain up to thirty days without further support.⁶⁸ Germany showed respectable engagement with 5,000 NATO certified troops or 25 % of the whole contingency of these NATO troops.⁶⁹ This development should foster NATO's capabilities in order to counter the threat of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction which were emphasized as the main threat after the attacks of September 11, 2001.

The decisions made during the NATO meeting in Prague were immediately implemented in the German National Guidelines for Defense Policy or *Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien*, and the conceptual design of the *Bundeswehr* or *Konzeption der Bundeswehr*. The red-green coalition states in the conceptual design of the Bundeswehr that "the transatlantic partnership remains the main pillar of German security policy, because a secure Europe without the U.S. is inconceivable. Furthermore this cooperation is historically grown, based on common cultural roots, and serves the common interests and values. Therefore the security strategies of Europe and the United States are intrinsically tied together."⁷⁰

C. COOPERATION IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY PILLAR - EUROPE'S QUEST FOR AUTONOMY, 1992-2005

The development of the European Union was always linked to an attempt to build a common security policy. The first attempt was made by France in 1954 to build the

⁶⁷ Ständige Vertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bei der Nordatlantikpakt Organisation, "Neue Verteidigungsfähigkeiten – Die schnelle Eingreiftruppe der NATO (NATO Response Force/NRF) und die 'Neue Fähigkeitsinitiative'", <http://www.nato.int/germany/verteidigungsfahigkeiten.html>, (accessed April 12, 2007).

⁶⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Handbook*, (Brussels, NATO, 2006), 177. See also: Klaus Olshausen, Die neue NATO, 420, In: *Sicherheitspolitik in neuen Dimensionen, Ergänzungsband 1*, edited by Peter Eickenboom et al, 391-425, Hamburg, Berlin, Bonn: Verlag E.S. Mittler und Sohn, 2004.

⁶⁹ Johannes Varwick, Deutsche Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik in der Nordatlantischen Allianz: Die Politik der rot-grünen Bundesregierung 1998-2003, In: Harnisch, Katsioulis, Overhaus, *Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik, Eine Bilanz der Regierung Schroeder* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004), 28.

⁷⁰ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Grundzüge der Konzeption der Bundeswehr*, (Cologne: Druckerei J.P. Bachem GmbH und Co KG, 2004): 8.

European Defense Community (EDC). This attempt had two main goals: first, to achieve a deeper integration of the European member states, especially Germany, into the European Union and second, to develop a security community which would lead to the development of a common economic and monetary union. After it failed to be ratified by the French National Parliament in 1954, NATO remained the main organization responsible for European Security.⁷¹

After the French attempt failed it took the collapse of the bipolar world to change the global environment for the development of the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. However the European Union had not developed a common security and defense policy nor had it developed a common command structure for military missions.

The European members finally became aware that a discrepancy existed between the European strength in economical and financial issues and security issues. In 1998 the United Kingdom (UK) feared that NATO might become unnecessary due to the changed global security environment and the lack of European capabilities. It feared that the U.S. might turn its back on NATO because Europe over the years after 1989/90 had not changed its capabilities from land-based military assets towards fast deployable troops. The U.S. had often demanded that the Europeans do so. The Balkan Wars had made it particularly obvious that the European forces were neither fast-deployable nor able to work sufficiently together with the more modern U.S. forces.

Together with France, the UK started the development of the ESDP to “give Europe a stronger role in international affairs.”⁷² France, only a political member of NATO, followed its historic tradition to develop an ESDP which would lead to a more independent European security. This should enable the European states to gain a more European balance in NATO and “give themselves more options for dealing with future

⁷¹Jena-Yves Haine. An historical perspective, in: Nicole Gnesotto (ed.), *EU Security and Defense Policy. The First Five Years 1999-2004* (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 35, <http://www.iss-eu.org/books/5esdpen.pdf>, accessed 20. February 2007.

⁷²Ivaylo Gatev, “Britain’s foreign policy activism and the emerging ESDP,” *The Journal of European Affairs* Volume I, No 2(November 2003): 46.

crises, especially in cases in which the U.S. may be reluctant to become involved.”⁷³ In sum, the French attempt was not focused on NATO; rather, to achieve the position where Europe could act autonomously when needed.⁷⁴ Germany was not invited due to the mistrust of France and Britain towards the new German administration. Understandably, the British change in foreign policy towards the development of an institution where British forces would have to be assigned to commands besides NATO raised fears on the other side of the Atlantic. The U.S., as well as other European NATO members not members of the European Union, feared that with this British-French attempt an institution might evolve which might become a rival towards NATO, and eventually diminish NATO as an effective security organization within Europe.

Soon after the St. Malo meeting, the U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in December 1998 declared that the U.S. would only accept the development of a European Security and Defense Policy if it “...is consistent with the basic principles that served the Atlantic partnership well for 50 years.”⁷⁵ A development from the U.S. perspective was only acceptable if it would consider that no duplication, no discrimination, and no decoupling would be ensured. With these three D’s the U.S. wanted to ensure that no duplication of NATO’s assets or capabilities would be built, that no European NATO member not member of the European Union would be discriminated against, and that the European Union would not foster developments which would allow the European Union decision making process to be unhooked from NATO, by which the EU would become independent of NATO. Lord Robertson, the Secretary General of NATO, only one year later tried to ease the tensions between the U.S. and the EU by proposing that a European Security and Defense Policy should develop under the conditions of three I’s:

⁷³ Kristin Archik, “NATO and the European Union“, CRS Report to Congress, updated 3. January 2006, Summary, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/61468.pdf>.

⁷⁴ Kristin Archik, “NATO and the European Union“, CRS Report to Congress, updated 3. January 2006, 20, Summary, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/61468.pdf>.

⁷⁵ Madeleine K. Albright, “The Right Balance Will Secure NATO’s Future,” in: Financial Times, 7 Dec. 1999, reprint in: Maartje Rutten (ed.), *From St-Malo to Nice. European defence: core documents* (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper 47, May 2001), 10-12, <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai47e.pdf>, accessed April 13 2007.

- That any EU development should *improve* the European defense capabilities;
- Provide *inclusiveness* and transparency for all allies; and
- Ensure the *indivisibility* of transatlantic security, based on shared values.

By these points Robertson wanted to ensure that a European security development would not mean "...less U.S....[but] more Europe...and a stronger NATO."⁷⁶

In 1999 in Helsinki under the German *Ratspraesidentschaft* or German Council Presidency and the experience of the NATO air campaign in Kosovo the EU announced its intent to "develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises."⁷⁷ Germany therefore took the bilateral issue of France and Britain and made it an issue of the whole European Union. The attempt for autonomy became an issue for the first time in the strategy of its security. Thereafter the EU decided, at the Helsinki summit in 1999, to establish a stringent institutional decision-making framework for ESDP and to establish a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) of 60,000 soldiers, deployable within 60 days, and sustainable up to one year. This force would become operational in 2003, with the capability to undertake the Petersberg-Tasks. This contingent would not be a standing force, but the several nations would designate national forces which would then be assimilated in the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF).⁷⁸ The primary goals ratified during the Helsinki meeting were implemented in the Amsterdam Treaty, where the Petersberg Tasks were integrated in the Common Foreign Security Policy of the European Union (CFSP). The EU member states committed themselves to increase their military capabilities, enhance their technological

⁷⁶ George Robertson, "NATO in the new Millennium," in: NATO Review, 47:4 (Winter 1999), p. 3-7, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1999/9904-01.htm>, (accessed 14 April 2007).

⁷⁷ Madeleine K. Albright, "The Right Balance Will Secure NATO's Future," in: Financial Times, 7 Dec. 1999, reprint in: Maartje Rutten (ed.), From St-Malo to Nice. European defence: core documents (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper 47, May 2001), 15, <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai47e.pdf>, (accessed April 13 2007).

⁷⁸ Kristin Archik, "NATO and the European Union", CRS Report to Congress, updated 3. January 2006, Summary, 15, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/61468.pdf>.

abilities, and to harmonize their defense planning. In this strategic policy Germany became the engine of the European development and was willing to follow this track, which meant that own military capabilities could be assigned to EU missions. Besides this development Germany supported the establishing of a broader approach to security than NATO alone. With the decision made by the European Union in Feira in June 2000, the EU moved to develop the potential of police, judicial, civil, and disaster relief personnel, in addition to enhanced military capabilities, in order to prepare for future experiences similar to the Balkan conflict.⁷⁹ With this major decision the ESDP not only technically enlarges its operational capabilities for a much wider array of missions than NATO, but also ensures that it is able to contribute civilian personnel for crisis prevention, crisis management and post crisis missions. The numbers of personnel available for such missions were finally set during the Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference in 2004, whereby 5761 police forces, 631 judicial personnel, 562 administrative personnel, and 4988 experts for disaster relief operations were agreed by its members.⁸⁰

In the EU Conference in Nice, in December 2000, the European members decided to establish a command structure to plan for ERF missions. During this meeting the member states made the decision to integrate the former WEU tasks into the EU, and decided to establish a Policy Coordination Group (PCG) where the ambassadors of the member states define the political and strategic goals, a European Military Committee (EUMC) which supports the PCG, and a European Military Staff (EUMS) which is responsible for the operational planning process.⁸¹ This affirms that Germany was willing to integrate military issues into the political decision process in Brussels, and that the EU established its own NATO-independent command structures for EU operations. This command cell is similar to NATO's, and provides the necessary infrastructure for

⁷⁹ Peter Eickenboom, "Die Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik-Gegenwart und Zukunft," In: *Sicherheitspolitik in neuen Dimensionen, Ergänzungsband 1*, edited by Peter Eickenboom et al, 12, Hamburg, Berlin, Bonn: Verlag E.S. Mittler und Sohn, 2004.

⁸⁰ Volker Heise, "ESVP in transatlantischer Perspektive, mehr Unterschiede als Gemeinsamkeiten?," Diskussionspapier der Forschungsgruppe EU-Außenbeziehungen der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, (March 2006): 6.

⁸¹ Friedrich W. Korkisch, "Europäische Union. Die EU-Gipfelkonferenz von Nizza," Österreichische Militäerzeitung Jahrgang 39, 3(2001): 363

ESDP.⁸² Germany never developed its own military general staff because its armed forces were always assigned under NATO command, avoiding development toward armed forces which might become a state within the state. However, the development of a NATO-autonomous European command structure is in fact the development of a general staff responsible for EU missions, with German participation.

The global environment changed with the experience of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September 2001, and made asymmetrical threats an issue which had to be taken into account in much the manner that nuclear weapons had been the center of gravity for half a century. Where the first Headline Goal of 1999 was mainly driven by the experiences of the Kosovo war, the current Headline Goal should tackle the shortfall of “highly mobile specialized forces”. Acknowledged by the EU defense ministers in 2004, 13 Battle Groups would be established by 2007 with 1500 men each, deployable within 15 days and ready to conduct high intensive operations, sustainable up to 30 days and in a rotational term up to 120 days.⁸³

The missions for which these forces are established can be affirmed by the Petersberg Tasks and the first European Security Strategy ratified in December 2003⁸⁴. The Petersberg Tasks consist of four possible scenarios: humanitarian assistance, search and rescue, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. The European Security Strategy (ESS) affirms five threats: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, states’ failure, and organized crime. Germany as a member of the EU acknowledges these threats in language similar to NATO, that “the most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction.”⁸⁵ Hereby one can see that the threat assessment is common to both organizations, and that

⁸² Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, “Beyond the EU/NATO dichotomy the beginnings of a European strategic culture,” *International Affairs* 77:3(2001): 594.

⁸³ Burckhard Schmitt. “European Capabilities: How many divisions?,” in: Nicole Gnesotto (ed.), *EU Security and Defense Policy. The First Five Years 1999-2004* (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 98, <http://www.iss-eu.org/books/5esdpen.pdf>, (accessed 20. February 2007).

⁸⁴ Council of the European Union, *European Security Strategy*, Brussels, December 2003, <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/st15/st15895.en03.pdf>, accessed 10 March 2006.

⁸⁵ Council of the European Union, *European Security Strategy*, Brussels, December 2003, 6, <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/st15/st15895.en03.pdf>, (accessed 09 February 2007).

Germany technically supported the development of a stand-alone European command structure for EU's autonomous operations by the development of independent forces and command structures.

D. COOPERATION BETWEEN NATO AND EU

All NATO states welcomed the purpose of the ESDP in December 2002, including military operations, but within the boundaries that EU military operations should only be conducted in areas where “NATO as a whole is not engaged.”⁸⁶ To avoid any parting of the ways between NATO and the EU, and to foster the development of both NATO and EU, the “Berlin-Plus” package, agreed to by both organizations in Washington in April 1999 and finally ratified in March 2003,⁸⁷ enabled the EU to borrow Alliance assets and capabilities for EU-led operations. This option not only increased EU's capabilities for specific operations but furthermore avoided the duplication of assets which are available in NATO but not within the EU.⁸⁸ In addition, this agreement ensured NATO the right to grant use as well as to refuse these assets if deemed necessary. The fact that the use of NATO assets is dependent on the consensus decision of NATO heavily influenced by the U.S., and that NATO can refuse these assets makes this agreement fragile, and fosters especially the French attempt to develop independent capabilities.⁸⁹ France did in fact demand assured access to NATO capabilities, which were refused by the U.S. Furthermore, France believed that the consultation mechanism of the “Berlin-plus” agreement could be abused by the U.S. to influence EU operations. Besides this, France feared that NATO's demands for right of first refusal might

⁸⁶ Frank Kupferschmidt, „Strategische Partnerschaft in der Bewaehrung,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Deutsches Institut fuer Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, April 2006, 7.

⁸⁷ Peter Eickenboom et al., *Die Europaeische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik – Gegenwart und Zukunft. In Bundesakademie fuer Sicherheitspolitik: Sicherheitspolitik in neuen Dimensionen, Ergaenzungsband 1* (Hamburg, Berlin, Bonn: Verlag Mittler & Sohn, 2004), 14.

⁸⁸ Archik, Kristin, „NATO and the European Union“, CRS Report to Congress, updated 3. January 2006, Summary, 16, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/61468.pdf>.

⁸⁹ France's main interest is to increase the European actionability through degradation of NATO. By increasing European capacity to act, France wants to encourage its own position in the European Union. In: Ronja Kempin, “Frankreich und die EU-Battlegroups: Diskussionspapier,” Forschungsgruppe Sicherheitspolitik Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Deutsches Institute fuer International Politik und Sicherheit, Mai 2004, 3.

constrain the liberty of EU decision making because it would cause EU dependence on NATO. Therefore a duplication of its own assets seemed to be unavoidable in some areas because NATO would only provide planning and command structures, as well as capabilities if they did not need these capabilities for themselves. Furthermore questions are unanswered if the EU is always willingly to accept that one veto of any NATO member could refuse any capabilities, furthermore the question if the EU, especially France is willing to accept the D-SACEUR (always a British or German Flag-officer) of an EU operation with NATO assets is still unanswered. Especially France might not be willing to accept that EU operations are always under Operation Command (OPCOM) of a German or British Flag officer.

As stated, NATO decisions to donate assets will be made on a case by case basis, and time will tell if the EU will always be willing to accept these provisions. The decision made by France and Germany to conduct an EU-led operation under UN resolution in Congo in 2003 and 2006 without assets of NATO and without previous consultation with NATO and especially the U.S., again caused tensions in the relationship between NATO and the EU. This attempt to operate without NATO assets is the second path which the EU can embark on when autonomous operations are preferred. These examples demonstrate that the demand of NATO for the right of first refusal has not limited independent action by the EU. With this development Germany not only had supported a position that placed the EU and NATO as rivals, but also could become involved in three problematic scenarios which may lead to further tensions between both organizations: first, the reaction of NATO if an EU-led operation with NATO assets where NATO assets get lost, or if the primary operation of the EU becomes more violent than anticipated, where further NATO support is necessary for success, but not guaranteed because of the veto. Second, a similar situation might arise if NATO assets support an EU-led operation but then need those same assets for its own operational purposes for a new conflict. This is yet a theoretical case which might become reality some day. Third, no agreement has yet been made about the share of labor in operational areas where both NATO as well as EU are operating in the same area at the same time.

These potentially critical situations cause insecurity about the reliability between both organizations, and distrust still exists not only on both sides the Atlantic but also within the European Union. Differences can be seen as well in the fact that France prefers EU operations without the Berlin-plus agreement where for Germany "...the use of NATO assets remains first choice."⁹⁰ Only long-term developments will show how far the German attempt to link the European options with the transatlantic options will finally be able to bind France closer to NATO.⁹¹ Unfortunately the Schroeder administration has moved closer to France's demand for more autonomy, and also tried to saturate NATO integration without taking into account the unresolved rivalry between both organizations.

There seems to be a division of labor between what the EU is willing and actually able to do and what NATO is better equipped for. The undeniable fact that the EU and especially Germany does not have the capabilities and is still not willing to increase its defense budgets shows clearly that they do rely on soft rather than hard power. The operational area of the EU is concentrated on the periphery of the EU and focuses less on military issues.

The gap of European assets especially in the realm of Command, Control, Computers, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) is still unsolved. The EU made attempts to minimize the capability gap but Europe is still unable to conduct global operations, and the development of the ESDP is still dependent on NATO in highly intensive operations. The pooling of military capabilities is congruent to the capabilities which are demanded in the Defense Capability Initiative (DCI) of NATO.

Furthermore the EU operations of the past very much affirm this concept of shared labor. Some operations such as Concordia were done under the Berlin-plus

⁹⁰ Peter Eickenboom et al., "Die Europaeische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik – Gegenwart und Zukunft." *In Bundesakademie fuer Sicherheitspolitik: Sicherheitspolitik in neuen Dimensionen, Ergaenzungsband I* (Hamburg, Berlin, Bonn: Verlag Mittler & Sohn, 2004), 15.

⁹¹ Marco Overhaus et al, "Deutschland und die Europaeische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik 1998-2003: Gewollte Ambivalenz oder fehlende Strategie?" In: Harnisch, Katsioulis, Overhaus, *Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik, Eine Bilanz der Regierung Schroeder* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004), 39.

agreement where the EU used the command and planning capabilities of NATO, the D-SACEUR was the operational commander, and the European Force Commander was supported by the Senior Military Representative of NATO. Similar arrangements were established during the operation Althea. In sum, the EU is taking over operations when NATO has accomplished the more robust task and when less demanding military requirements are necessary; it is operating independently of NATO in less intensive operations at the lower end of the Petersberg Tasks.

However, the EU-led operations without support by NATO show a less significant amount of cooperation. The EU did not consult NATO concerning the Congo operation in spring 2006. This shows a lesser degree of transparency and consultation than operations under Berlin-plus arrangements. The German-French agreement to develop an independent EU airlift command, a satellite intelligence community, and a common European Defense market during the EU meeting in Mainz in June 2000 shows that some EU countries are pushing the development further ahead. All these points were later integrated in the summit meeting or so called *Pralinengipfel* (bon-bon summit) of Germany, France, Luxemburg and Belgium in 2003.

Without question, the development of the ESDP was not only a surprising result of the British change in foreign security policy but also a development that took place with uncommon speed in the short timeframe since 1998 . However ESDP as an integral part of the European Union is still in a developing process. So far “the EU’s gradual accumulation of confidence and expertise in a new and largely unfamiliar area of policy will steadily enhance its credibility as a potential military actor.”⁹² That the development of ESDP European politics is becoming an engine which is running on its own steam can be observed, although some EU countries did push the development more forward than others. A prime example is when France, Germany, Luxemburg, and Belgium met in April 2003 to discuss the further development of security and defense issues of the European Union, and some feared that this might be an anti-American attempt for a more independent ESDP.

⁹² Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, “Beyond the EU/NATO dichotomy the beginnings of a European strategic culture,” *International Affairs* 77:3(2001): 595.

This fear was well founded. These same four countries that rejected the US-led war in Iraq and for weeks blocked NATO planning for the protection of Turkey, had now decided to accelerate the EU's security development. However these countries finally agreed to establish a "nucleus" which enables the European Union to command their operations independently from NATO. This is especially interesting due to the fact that a few months before, in December 2002, an agreement was reached which ensured the EU the use of NATO planning and command structures.⁹³ This could be seen as a general headquarters of the European Union, and could also be seen as a duplication of NATO capabilities. However, this nucleus is not comparable to the command structure of NATO in its capabilities, but it is similar in its structure.⁹⁴ Furthermore these four states decided to develop an EU airlift command which would support NATO as well as EU operations.⁹⁵ However its own independent command structure as well as its own strategic airlift capabilities would not be necessary if the EU would be willing in every circumstance to operate under the Berlin-plus agreement and integrate NATO. But the EU shows by this move that these nations want to strengthen the option to operate without NATO interference. The development of an EU cell which is integrated within the command structure of NATO in SHAPE only provides an opportunity for the EU to enhance the preparation of missions under the Berlin-plus agreement, but the EU prefers that autonomous military EU operations are mainly led by national or multinational headquarters.⁹⁶

This attempt for more autonomy can also be observed in the development of the European Constitution. It provides for European Union members commit forces in case

⁹³ Peter Schmidt, "ESVP und Allianz nach dem Vierergipfel," Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik 20(2003): 3.

⁹⁴ Marco Overhaus et al, *Deutschland und die Europaeische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik 1998-2003: Gewollte Ambivalenz oder fehlende Strategie? In: Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik, Eine Bilanz der Regierung Schroeder* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004), 41.

⁹⁵ Bruesseler Treffen zur Europaeischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik: Staerkung des Europaeischen Pfeilers der NATO; Gemeinsame Erklarung Deutschlands, Frankreichs, Luxemburg und Belgiens zur ESVP. Streitkreaftamt Abteilung III, Fachinformationszentrum der Bundeswehr (FIZBw), April 2003, 2.

⁹⁶ Peter Eickenboom, "Die Europaische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik-Gegenwart und Zukunft," In: Peter Eickenboom et al, *Sicherheitspolitik in neuen Dimensionen, Ergaenzungsband 1*, (Hamburg, Berlin, Bonn: Verlag E.S. Mittler und Sohn, 2004), 16.

of an attack on the territory of one EU member state, and to take all available military and other capabilities to support the attacked member.⁹⁷ This technically reduces NATO as the main organization for security and defense, if the EU were to have similar military capabilities at its disposal.

If one investigates what all EU operations in which Germany participated to date have in common is the threat assessment and the area of operation (AOO). The EU takes over operations from NATO when NATO has fulfilled the more military concentrated tasks, or the EU gets enrolled in missions which do not require high intensity use of force. Furthermore all EU missions are UN mandated missions, and at the European periphery. Still, the conceptual development of EU military capabilities is far ahead of the actual available capabilities of the EU. The EU dependence on NATO is still substantial. Therefore, the next chapter investigates the main capability gaps of the German armed forces, and the last chapter investigates how far the German society supports the entanglement of German armed forces in out-of-area missions, and if developments demonstrate that German society more and more identifies itself with the European Union, which would foster the political development for more autonomy.

In sum, one can posit that development of the ESDP was a rapid process where Germany and France made significant adjustments to its security policy. Germany moved closer to the French demand for more autonomy. Especially with the development of an independent NATO command structure, its own military airlift command, the development of its own defense research and development institute, and also with a much broader approach towards security with the development of police-forces, judicial capabilities, as well as administrative personnel and experts for disaster relief operations, Germany fostered the development of an institution which rivals NATO not only in existing circumstances but also in future security issues. The EU developed a two way path, one in which it is able to operate with and within the structure of NATO and its assets, and the second where it is able to operate totally independent of NATO. EU-only

⁹⁷ Art.I-40.7 European Convention, Art.III-214 European Convention, or: Josef Janning and Claus Giering, Konvent und Regierungskonferenz – Die Sicherheitsdimension im EU-Verfassungsentwurf, In: Peter Eickenboom et al, *Sicherheitspolitik in neuen Dimensionen, Ergänzungsband I*, (Hamburg, Berlin, Bonn: Verlag E.S. Mittler und Sohn, 2004), 37.

operations usually take place in less hostile environments, but the development of European Rapid Reaction Corps enables the EU even to operate with fast deployable troops in high intensity conflict environments. Berlin does not see any endangerment of NATO in the way both organizations have developed during this timeframe. Both organizations still exist, each with evolving missions, and two questions remain to be answered: first, the extent to which the capabilities of the German armed forces require a strong link to the better equipped, U.S.-led NATO organization, and second, if German society has developed a more European identity in which the *Bundeswehr* would participate regionally. If so, the disputes between the U.S. and Germany concerning the Iraq War may be the beginning of a “parting of the ways” concerning their understanding of legitimate pre-emptive strikes but also could be seen as the beginning of different understandings concerning the use of force within the respective political and strategic cultures of the two nations.

E. CONCLUSION

The administration change which took place in 1998 from the conservative and transatlantic oriented Chancellor Helmut Kohl to the socialist and Europeanist Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder was a decisive moment in the security policy of Germany. This change of politics may also be explained as a generational change. However the policy of integration does not show any relevant change towards NATO rather than continuity by its support of the strategically change of NATO's security policy. Besides evolving support of NATO we can also see that a rapid development of more and more autonomous European Security and Defense policy took place during these years. Ironically these changes were enabled by the British change of foreign security policy after the experiences of the Balkan Wars. The British feared that the European military capabilities were too weak, and that this weakness might lead to the diminishing of NATO from a U.S. perspective, and triggered the British attempt to accelerate European capabilities in order to ensure NATO's survival. However this attempt was guided by France and Germany into a slightly different direction. The meeting of the four continental European states--Belgium, Luxembourg, France, and Germany--in April 2004

enabled the development of more autonomous European security. Germany for the first time in its history moved closer to the French idea of European security, but not without wholly discrediting NATO. However this development shows a change which raises two issues. The first is the extent to which the German armed forces' security needs determined its motivation for a more autonomous European security on a quasi Gaullist model. The second is the extent to which the change of German foreign policy is not only a political change of one party, but finds its support in a society which more and more prefers a European identity rather than traditional transatlantic cooperation.

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V. GERMAN ARMED FORCES AND THE GERMAN SOCIETY

A. INTRODUCTION

The basic assumption of many European states after the Cold War has been that future conflicts would be rare and mainly solved by non-military means. This ideal was heavily damaged by the experiences of the Balkan Wars. However, after 1990 the western states cut their defense expenditures, redirecting funds toward a peace dividend in order to enhance their welfare states. “Between 1990 and 1994, U.S. defense spending, measured in constant prices, declined at an average rate of 5.3 percent per year. Only NATO members Belgium and Germany cut defense spending at a faster rate during this period.”⁹⁸ The Balkan Wars finally showed that the interoperability of the European forces was not the only problem but the major point of European weaknesses. As the German armed forces participated during the air campaign *Allied Force* with 14 Tornados as Multi role Combat Aircrafts (MRCA) between March 1999 and June 1999 not only showed an obvious quantitative gap but also a qualitative gap with US flying forces. The lack of precision guided bombs, real time data-links, and information concerning friend of foe exchange are only a few of the capabilities where interoperability was not on an equal footing.⁹⁹ The experiences showed that a lack of capabilities constrained the autonomy not only of German but of European operations.

However, this chapter does not investigate quantitative differences between Germany’s armed forces and the rest of the transatlantic alliance. The European Union is able to master autonomous operations by itself with the developments made with ESDP; therefore, the efficiency of this growing institution will be assumed here for the purposes of this study. But this chapter investigates what major capabilities Germany as a part of the European Union is lacking, and to what extent the defense budget constrains its

⁹⁸ Wallace J. Thies, *Friendly Rivals. Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO*, (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 2003). 195.

⁹⁹ Jan Kuebart, „Die NATO-Luftoperationen im Kosovo“, in: Rafael Biermann, *Deutsche Konfliktbewältigung auf dem Balkan, Erfahrungen und Lehren aus dem Einsatz*, (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2002), 260.

military capabilities. This analysis demonstrates that Germany and the EU remain dependent on NATO for crises of higher intensity. The next step is to compare the security developments of NATO and EU, and how these developments either supported close cooperation or contributed towards more autonomous European capabilities.

The second part of this chapter then investigates the parallel movement of German politics and society toward a more European identity over the recent decades. By investigating this issue it becomes clear that the rejection of the Iraq War was not only an issue of Chancellor Schroeder and President George W. Bush not liking each other. Furthermore, the Schroeder attempt to make these differences public to win his election is surely another statement for example made by the US scholar Stephen S. Szabo. Evidence is found that traces the development of a more European identification within German society, which in the long term will increase the tensions between the European and the transatlantic security organizations. With the investigation of German political opinion, we find evidence that the development of more autonomous European capabilities is not only a development based on Social Democratic party, but also finds its support in a growing European identity within German society.

B. THE CAPABILITIES OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES

During recent years defense expenditures worldwide increased significantly, especially after the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York on the morning of September 11, 2001. The strategic changes made afterwards affected all members of NATO. The necessity for a transformation of the German armed forces were first acknowledged in May 2003 with the defense political guidelines or *Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien* of the former German Minister of Defense Dr. Peter Struck. Only one year later this led to a revamped concept of the German armed forces in August 2004. This paper prioritizes the same threats as the NATO Strategic Concept. International terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and the comparison of both are the highest threats at present.¹⁰⁰ The process of transformation should be an endurable,

¹⁰⁰ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. *Grundzuege der Konzeption der Bundeswehr*. (Cologne: Druckerei J.P. Bachem GmbH und Co KG, 2004): 7.

foresighted process which should enhance the capabilities of the Bundeswehr. It should confront the rationales, concepts, training, organization, and equipment of the armed forces, and finally establish something totally new.¹⁰¹

Surely the global change of security made it necessary to adopt and rapidly change the capabilities of armed forces. Since 1989, 26 states have collapsed, new threats appeared and Germany with its 5,800 armoured tanks, 650 airplanes, and 36 brigades were fitted for an essential support of its NATO allies to fight any Warsaw attack on German soil.¹⁰² But this time was gone. The new challenges demand new capabilities able to project power into locales of conflict and crisis far away from Europe. The main deficiencies can be seen in the realms of strategic airlift capacities, intelligence, precision guided ammunition, and command and control abilities.

The security environment made a change necessary, and it was acknowledged by the red-green coalition with the defense policy guidelines. Since then, however, the general transformation set out in the guidelines lacks the financial base in order to achieve enhanced capabilities. Only minor changes have taken place during recent years. This of course is not only a typically German but a European problem. Although the German defense expenditure surely is not appropriately comparable to the expenditure paid by the US, German spending levels as one of the European major powers should be comparable to those of Britain and France. Germany's defense budget since 2001 has steadily decreased, and shows a contrary development to the other major European states. France spent 46.2 billion USD during 2005, where Britain spent 48.3 billion USD in the same year. Germany, for many years ranking among the first five in worldwide military spending, appropriated 33.2 billion USD, ranking 6th behind Japan, and China and is likely to be overcome in the next years by Russia.¹⁰³ But besides the countable numbers,

¹⁰¹ Dr. Peter Struck, Vorwort zu den Grundzuegen der Konzeption der Bundeswehr, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. *Grundzuege der Konzeption der Bundeswehr*. (Cologne: Druckerei J.P. Bachem GmbH und Co KG, 2004): 3.

¹⁰² General a.D. Dr. Klaus Reinhardt, "Die Bundeswehr braucht die Besten und nicht die Entbehrlichen," aus: Reservisten Report 3/2007, 40, in: Loyal, Magazin fuer Sicherheitspolitik, March 2006.

¹⁰³ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 2006: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 302.

money is not only available in an unsatisfactory amount but it is also spent for questionable issues. Due to the lack of strategic airlift capabilities Germany spent 53.5 million USD during 2003 for the transportation of 16,400 tons of material from Germany to Afghanistan. From the beginning of January in 2002 until December 2002 178 flights by Antonow Type An-124, and 191 flights with Ilyushin Typ Il-76 were chartered.¹⁰⁴ The actual Transall C-130 is not able to meet the required capabilities and the preferred Airbus A400-M will not be in service until 2010. Besides these costs Germany will have to pay 8.3 billion Euros for 180 Eurofighters. The cost of one Eurofighter is actually 108.3 million Euros, which could be used to buy 259 armored troop vehicles like the Dingo, a key piece of equipment most needed in all out-of-area missions. The actual capabilities are described in the 2007 *Wehrplan* or defense plan by Chief of Staff General Schneiderhahn as "...a modernization [that] is not achievable in the assigned timeframe...and that financial defense investments could only be made in a restricted volume."¹⁰⁵ With a defense expenditure of 1.5% of Germany's gross domestic product (GDP) in 2001, Germany is investing much less than France with 2.6% and Britain with 2.5%. On a different level, Germany invested only 23.2% of its defense expenditure for investment in new assets, whereby France invested 35.4% and Britain even 38.6% of its defense expenditure for future systems.¹⁰⁶ The actual costs for out-of-area missions did rise in an unexpected dimension. While 377 million Euros were planned to be spent for the Afghanistan contingency, 500 million were paid during 2005, and while only 418 million were calculated for the year 2006, the operating costs were 13% above the estimated costs and 472, million Euros were finally spent.¹⁰⁷ A re-nationalization of Germany's foreign security policy can be negated by these facts. It is not a purely national solution; rather, a common solution which therefore has to be investigated. Due

¹⁰⁴ Martin Wagener et al., "Auf dem Weg zu einer normalen Macht? Die Entsendung deutscher Streitkräfte in der Ära Schroeder," In: Harnisch, Katsioulis, Overhaus, *Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik, Eine Bilanz der Regierung Schroeder*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004, 102.

¹⁰⁵ Griephanbriefe, "Wöchentliche Informationen zum Geschäftsfeld äussere und innere Sicherheit," No. 16/2007, 1.

¹⁰⁶ Martin Wagener et al., "Auf dem Weg zu einer normalen Macht? Die Entsendung deutscher Streitkräfte in der Ära Schroeder," In: Harnisch, Katsioulis, Overhaus, *Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik, Eine Bilanz der Regierung Schroeder*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004, 110.

¹⁰⁷ General Anzeiger, "Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr teurer," In: Pressespiegel, April 23, 2007.

to its lack of capabilities, as Mary Elise Sarotte of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London puts it, “Germany’s credibility and image as a good EU and NATO partner is now in question in an unprecedented way.”¹⁰⁸

As explained by its lack of military and financial assets, Germany did not have the opportunity to choose a unilateral course. This fact forces Germany to acknowledge that NATO’s and the EU’s defense capability developments have to be compatible. The lack of financial resources would otherwise overwhelm its budget as well as its capabilities. But this in some sense is contrary to the development a more autonomous EU capability as supported by the *Pralinengipfel* (chocolate summit) of France, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Germany in April 2003 in Brussels. Did Germany with its *Ruestungspolitik* or Defense politics intend that it was not only willing to transform its armed forces but also enhance its capabilities to be a more reliable partner in NATO, the EU or in both?

With the ratification of the European Capability Action Plan in November 2001 the European Union wanted to enhance “...effectiveness and efficiency of European military capability efforts.” This should be done in “coordination between EU member states and cooperation with NATO [in order to] avoid wasteful duplication and ensure transparency and consistency with NATO.”¹⁰⁹ With this voluntary approach of the EU members nineteen panels were established in order to enhance the European capabilities. Germany participates in 12 of these panels, and is the leading nation in the realm of combat search and rescue and tactical unmanned air vehicles for surveillance and reconnaissance assets. With the decision of Germany to take a leading role in the ERRF with 18,000 soldiers, Germany shows a deep European integration in the European defense development as well. However, NATO followed a more focused track with its decision during the Prague summit in 2002. The Prague Capability Commitment (PCC)

¹⁰⁸ Mariot Elise Sarotte, in Martin Aguera et al., “Deutsche Verteidigungs- und Ruestungsplanung im Kontext von NATO und EU: Ein Reparatur-Werkstattbericht,” *In: Harnisch, Katsioulis, Overhaus, Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik, Eine Bilanz der Regierung Schroeder*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004, 120.

¹⁰⁹ Martin Aguera et al., “Deutsche Verteidigungs- und Ruestungsplanung im Kontext von NATO und EU: Ein Reparatur-Werkstattbericht,” *In: Harnisch, Katsioulis, Overhaus, Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik, Eine Bilanz der Regierung Schroeder*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004, 126.

the members of NATO agreed to transform their capabilities for combat operations outside Europe. Special capabilities such as strategic airlift, aerial refuelling, and fast deployable troops had to be established. The NATO Response Force (NRF) is an example of the new challenge NATO wanted to meet.¹¹⁰ Besides the development of the NRF, NATO decided to concentrate on three key aspects of activity in order to meet the new challenges of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The three major key capabilities were: aerial refuelling under Spanish leadership, precision guided weapons under Dutch leadership, and strategic air transport under German leadership.¹¹¹ It should be noted that the enhancement of capabilities in NATO are efforts which have to be undertaken by the European members, who at the same time are members of the EU. Both organizations, NATO as the EU, concentrate on enhancing similar capabilities in the military realm. Due to the fact that only European states have to enhance their abilities this will require a close consultation and collaboration of the European states; the similar capabilities which have to be developed for the EU as well as for NATO the developments ensure interoperability.

The threat assessment of Germany acknowledges the same threats as the EU and NATO does. However, in choosing the means to solve these problems Germany is more in favor of the European approach to use not only military assets. Germany states in its White Paper from 2006 that “Risks and threats have to be countered with diplomatic, economic, foreign aid, and if necessary with the use of force.”¹¹² Hereby one can see that both organizations have developed comparably in threat assessment and the necessary assets which have to be developed by the European members. However one can also see that both organizations developed differently. NATO concentrates with its NATO Response Force on the capability for *high-end* conflict, where with the European Union’s decision to enhance its military capabilities as well as to develop more effective civil

¹¹⁰ Kristin Archick. “NATO and the European Union” (CRS Report to Congress, updated 3 Jan., 2006), <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/61468.pdf>, (accessed March 23, 2007): 3-6.

¹¹¹ Martin Aguera et al., “Deutsche Verteidigungs- und Rüstungsplanung im Kontext von NATO und EU: Ein Reparatur-Werkstattbericht,” *In: Harnisch, Katsioulis, Overhaus, Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik, Eine Bilanz der Regierung Schroeder*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004, 128.

¹¹² Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. *Weissbuch 2006 zur Sicherheitspolitik und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr*. Cologne: Druckerei J.P. Bachem GmbH und Co KG, 2004, 29.

military capabilities, as described in chapter III, concentrates on both *high-* and *low- end* conflicts. Therefore the European Union, and especially Germany, is still dependent on NATO due to its lack of capabilities. Technically the necessary structure is developed and was supported by Germany during the Schroeder administration. With this development a rivalry does exist between both institutions and time will tell if the different assumptions about the means to be used for conflict resolution might endanger NATO's existence. Interestingly, the development of the EU can be seen as rapid and strong willed. Therefore the question has to be addressed about how the NATO and EU developments find support in German society.

C. THE GERMAN SOCIETY, GERMAN DEFENSE AND THE EU

Since the end of the bipolar world of the Cold War, tremendous changes and new challenges have shaped the security environment of the world. Globalization has become a major issue, and security of alliances can not be ensured only by military terms. Threats as acknowledged by the NATO Strategic Concept and the European Strategic Concept are similar. Both agree that new threats are different than those of the Cold War era and more diffuse than ever before. However, this would foster the idea that those threats can not only be confronted by military means. But as we have seen above only the EU developed a broad strategy to bring all necessary players to the field. Thus different opinions about the use of force still split the transatlantic as well as European relations during these last seventeen years. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder rejected any U.S. Iraq invasion long prior to the invasion of U.S. forces in March 2003. Even under a UN resolution the German administration was not willing to support this military effort. Besides this rejection we can see that a European security and defense policy developed not only in a short period of time, but also with a broad approach of diplomatic, economic, foreign aid, and if necessary military means. The European Union by some scholars is therefore to be seen as the only and unique security management institution actually existing. Still, due to the lack of capabilities and unwillingness to increase its defense expenditure Germany is dependent on NATO and especially on U.S. capabilities. However, we have to consider that Chancellor Schroeder won his 2003 election partly

because of his position to reject any Iraq invasion. Therefore we should investigate if this is not only true in the case of the Iraq War, but is a result of more widespread pacifist behavior now preferred by German society for general security issues. If so, one can assume that the development of a more civilian power defense strategy such as the EU provides is more favored by German society. This would line up more closely with EU strategy and should cause further adjustment of NATO policies towards more civil-military capabilities. Since security issues are also linked with energy and environmental issues these days, politics and policies of nations as well of alliances are steered even more by domestic interests and concerns. “All politics is local” was stated by Thomas O’Neill as a member of the U.S. Congress in the year 2000.¹¹³ Therefore one could suggest that the rejection of the Iraq War and its lack of support in German society was not only a concern about war and peace but also a concern of different beliefs about the means and ends of security policy. This would make a further European development more probable if NATO in the long term is not willing to broaden its approach towards the realm of civil-military capabilities and by doing so to increase the European weight within NATO.

A re nationalization of Germany’s security policy can not be observed during the last decades. Therefore a national solution towards the new security challenges is unworkable. The developments described in the last chapter show that Germany supported movement toward more autonomous European capabilities. If evidence exists that supports this approach, it will make clear that any further political development will have to take this opinion into account.

The transformation of the western security alliances, NATO as well as the EU, shows that conventional wars between states are becoming rarer than ever before. Interstate wars, ethnic conflicts, and religious conflict are the issues western societies have to deal with. Problems of defining combatants and non-combatants, ethnic cleansing like during the Balkan Wars, as well as access to conventional energy produce new

¹¹³ Sabine Collmer et al., “All politics is local: Deutsche Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik im Spiegel der Oeffentlichen Meinung,” *In: Harnisch, Katsioulis, Overhaus, Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik, Eine Bilanz der Regierung Schroeder*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004, 201.

dimensions in the security environment of today. Prosperity of the western states, and especially for Germany as one of the biggest export nations of the western world, is closely linked to these issues. The broad approach of the European Union, to prefer civilian means to solve these conflicts sets those nations, and especially Germany, apart from the U.S. tradition of a more hard power related security concept.

The above mentioned conflicts triggered the western alliances to develop more modern, fast deployable forces in order to meet these new challenges. Germany participated in many attempts to solve crises and to support peace building during the last decades. The former constitutional base to establish forces for territorial defense became less and less important in the aftermath of the Cold War.

Interestingly, the most threatening issues facing European nations in 1993 were: 1) proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 2) unemployment, 3) instability in Russia, 4) economic dominance of Japan and the U.S. This perception has shifted during recent years, and international terrorism, organized crime, and weapons of mass destruction became more dangerous threats than conventional or traditional wars.¹¹⁴ German citizens, however, prioritize social issues even higher. Fair wages (76 %), social security (73 %), and secure employment (68 %) are valued more important than *militaerische Sicherheit* or security and defense issues (66 %).¹¹⁵ However, the political elites decided to use the German armed forces more and more outside the regional territory in order to support multinational security organizations in solving conflicts in Africa, Central Eastern Europe, and the Far East. With this paradigmatic change a societal change can also be observed. According to an investigation of the Allensbach Institute more than 52 % of German society supports the use of the Bundeswehr to stabilize peace and believes that Germany has to share the burden in the international community. But beside these facts people also wish for a more independent European

¹¹⁴ European Commission, "Eurobarometer, Public Opinion in the European Union, No. 58," Umfragezeitraum Oct.-Nov. 2002, http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/, (accessed May 1, 2007)

¹¹⁵ Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, "Fruehjahrgutachten. Repraesentativbefragung zu den Einstellungen und Meinungen in der Bevoelkerung zur Sicherheitspolitik," Straussberg, December 2001.

defense industry. Especially feared is dependence on the U.S. in this issue.¹¹⁶ With the reduction of the German armed forces the question of *Wehrgerechtigkeit* or the equitableness of the conscript forces is becoming more and more an issue among youth. Only 37 % of the youth wants to serve as a conscript, where 50 % are in favour of professional forces.¹¹⁷ The German armed forces apparently enjoy a widespread reputation. However, many Germans share the attitude that they have no indebtedness to serve because they pay taxes. Therefore, while German citizens value the effort of the Bundeswehr in foreign regions, they do not want to participate in this effort personally. The numbers of refusals since 1990 have steadily increased. In 1999 as much as 42.2 % refused to serve as conscripts in the German armed forces. This decline, based on an investigation of the Ministry of Defense will further increase. The number of conscripts also decreased during the last decades due to the reduction of the German armed forces. In 1989, 218,194 Germans served as conscripts; in 2006, only 61,700 were drafted.¹¹⁸ Just as an observable generational change has taken place in the realm of politicians, who are now the leaders of the Federal Republic, one can also see that a generational change in the youth has taken place. An ethical change has changed the perception of duty and commitment. Idealistic selfishness, spontaneity, self-actualization, and leisure are more important than ever before. Florian Illies stated that this generation "...pays more attention how politicians are dressed rather than what they say or do...and that the members of this generation show a lack of emotions towards national as well as international policy."¹¹⁹ Generally the society trusts the institution Bundeswehr but also

¹¹⁶ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, "Aufgaben und Zukunft der Bundeswehr," Berlin, January 2003, http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/kcxml/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPLMnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLd4w39bQESUGYpvqRaGKGbn4IsSB9b31fj_zcVP0A_YLc0IhyR0dFALNCMzY!/delta/base64xml/L2dJQSEvUUt3QS80SVVFLzZfQV8xUFI!/?yw_contentURL=/C1256EF4002AED30/N264HUDH610MMISDE/content.jsp, (accessed May 1, 2007).

¹¹⁷ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, "Jugendliche ist die Bundeswehr wichtig," Berlin, February 2003, http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/kcxml/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPLMnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLd4w39bQESUGYpvqRaGKGbn4IsSB9b31fj_zcVP0A_YLc0IhyR0dFALNCMzY!/delta/base64xml/L2dJQSEvUUt3QS80SVVFLzZfQV8xUFI!/?yw_contentURL=/C1256EF4002AED30/N264HLGC263MMISDE/content.jsp, (accessed May 1, 2007).

¹¹⁸ Rolf Clement, "50-Jahre Wehrpflicht, immer umstritten, dennoch bewahrt," in: *Loyal, Journal fuer Sicherheitspolitik* (March 2007): 10.

¹¹⁹ Florian Illies, *Generation Golf, eine Inspektion* (Berlin: Argon-Verlag, Second Edition, 2001), 122.

has a little interest in security issues. However, taking the different missions of the Petersberg Tasks of 1992 into account, a different picture can be drawn. More than 63 % percent of Germans support the participation in humanitarian and peace enforcing missions. Nearly 58 % support participation in a European force. A significant change can also be seen regarding participation in NATO conflict and peace building missions. Only 40 % support a participation of the Bundeswehr in these types of operations with this institution.¹²⁰ A division can be acknowledged where the lower-end Petersberg Tasks are supported, as opposed to the use of force, mainly a task for NATO, is rejected. As Germans asked in one poll if, under specific circumstances, the use of force might be used to achieve justice, 62 % rejected this idea; even more, 68%, answered that conflicts independent of internal state or state against state conflicts could be solved by peaceful means. One can see that the German society not only rejects power politics supported by military means, but also thinks that this type of policy is less effective. Interestingly, 61 % believe that only military strength ensures a stable and continued peace.¹²¹ The experiences of the Second World War still seem to be deeply rooted in the German mind; even so, a generational change has taken place. However they do believe that only military strength makes peace stable. With the developments since 1998, the European Union technically possesses the structure to act more autonomously from NATO. The accomplished missions of the European Union with German participation--Democratic Republic Congo in 2003 and 2006, the operation Concordia which was the follow-on operation to relieve NATO in Macedonia 2003--were all perceived as successful.

Investigating the public opinion polling “Eurobarometers” of recent years, one can see that German society favors a European security and defense Policy, and support is steadily increasing.

¹²⁰ Sabine Collmer et al., “All politics is local: Deutsche Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik im Spiegel der Oeffentlichen Meinung,” *In: Harnisch, Katsioulis, Overhaus, Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik, Eine Bilanz der Regierung Schroeder*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004, 210.

¹²¹ Nikolas Busse, “Pazifistische Zuege. Eine Studie ueber das aussenpolitische Denken der Deutschen,” *Aus: Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung*, March 13, 2006.

Table 1. Agreement for a European Security and Defense Policy between 2001 and 2006. German agreement (GER) and the overall European member states agreement (EU).

	EB 56 Autumn 2001	EB 57 Spring 2002	EB 58 Autumn 2002	EB 59 Spring 2003	EB 60 Autumn 2003	EB 61 Spring 2004	EB 62 Autumn 2004	EB 63 Spring 2005	EB 64 Autumn 2005	EB 65 Spring 2006	EB 66 Autumn 2006
GER	78%	79%	79%	81%	76%	84%	80%	78%	-	86%	84%
EU	73%	71%	73%	74%	70%	77%	78%	75%	- ¹²²	75%	75%
Eurobarometer (EB) from 2001 to 2006 ¹²³											

With 78 % in 2001, 79 % in 2002, 81 % in 2003, and 84 % in the latest investigation in 2006 Germans favor an ESDP. In comparison, 42 % of all European states favor a European approach, but only 20 % favor delegating security issues to NATO. Interestingly, Denmark is the only European country which would favor delegating its security issues to NATO. Therefore the contrary visions concerning the Iraq War, Guantanamo, the U.S. willingness to consider pre-emptive engagements, the Kyoto-Protocol, and the rejection of the International Judicial Court or *Internationaler Strafgerichtshof* divides not only Germans but Europeans from the U.S. more widely than ever before. In European eyes, this has caused a decline in U.S. legitimacy to be a role model of democratic behavior.¹²⁴ In the timeframe Spring 2004, Autumn 2004, and Spring 2005 the Europeans were asked if they believe that the EU should develop a ESDP which is solely independent from any U.S. influence. Here an even higher degree of agreement can be found than for the agreement for the development of ESDP in

¹²² The Eurobarometer No. 64 does not provide data about the question of Table 1, See: European Commission, "Eurobarometer, Public Opinion in the European Union, No. 64, "Umfragezeitraum 2001 to 2006, http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/, (accessed May 1, 2007).

¹²³ The European Commission provides detailed data twice a year about the European memberstates and their attitude towards the European Union, See: European Commission, "Eurobarometer, Public Opinion in the European Union, No. 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, "Umfragezeitraum 2001 to 2006, http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/, (accessed May 1, 2007).

¹²⁴ Sabine Collmer et al., "All politics is local: Deutsche Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik im Spiegel der Oeffentlichen Meinung," *In: Harnisch, Katsioulis, Overhaus, Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik, Eine Bilanz der Regierung Schroeder*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004, 210. See also: European Commission, "Eurobarometer, Public Opinion in the European Union, No. 66, "Umfragezeitraum Herbst 2006, http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/, (accessed May 1, 2007)

general. In the same timeframe Germans were asked which institution they personally would prefer as the institution to decide about European security issues. Three options were given: NATO, EU, or National.

Concerning these results we can see that NATO is the institution which is favored least. Even a national option is more favored. The most preferred institution to make decisions about European security for the Germans during the timeframe autumn 2003 to autumn 2004 was the EU.

Table 2. Germans asked if the EU should develop a European Defense and Security Policy which is independent of the U.S. German agreement (GER)

	EB 61 Spring 2004	EB 62 Autumn 2004	EB 63 Spring 2005
GER	84%	90%	87%
Eurobarometer (EB): Spring 2004, Autumn 2004, Spring 2005.			

Table 3. Germans asked which of the three institutions should decide about European security German agreement (GER) towards NATO, EU, and NATIONAL

	EB 61 Spring 2004	EB 62 Autumn 2004	EB 63 Spring 2005
NATO	15%	15%	17%
EU	44%	44%	57%
NATIONAL	25%	25%	20%
Eurobarometer (EB): Autumn 2003, Spring 2004, Autumn 2004. ¹²⁵			

Only 23 % of all Europeans acknowledge a positive role for the U.S. in spreading world peace. Concerning the German burden in international affairs, a steady increase

¹²⁵ The questions answered in Table 2 and 3 were not part of the Eurobarometer before or afterwards. Therefore the percentages show only the data of the available years. See: European Commission, "Eurobarometer, Public Opinion in the European Union, No. 61, 62, 63," "Umfragezeitraum 2001 to 2006," http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/, (accessed May 1, 2007).

from 1997 to 2001 can be interpreted that Germans are satisfied with the responsibility Germany shares in the international environment. 65 % of all Germans think that its role is appropriate. But also a steady increase in the same timeframe from 1997 to 2001 notes that 12 % in 1997 to 17 % in 2001 demand a greater role for Germany in international affairs. Therefore one can see that in total 81 % of Germans vote for an active role of their country in foreign policy issues.¹²⁶ In tandem, a pan-European identification is evolving. Concerning the latest results, 59 % of Germans and 54 % of all European members would appreciate a development from the existing European Union towards a complete political Union. During the timeframe Spring 2002 to Autumn 2004 the Germans were asked about their personal identity. Do they view themselves as both Germans and Europeans, only as Germans, as Europeans first place and then as Germans, or solely as Europeans.

Table 4. Germans asked how they identify themselves: German and European, German, European and German, or just as a European. German (GER), European (EU).

I do feel as..	EB 57 Spring 2002	EB 58 Autumn 2002	EB 59 Spring 2003	EB 60 Autumn 2003	EB 61 Spring 2004	EB 62 Autumn 2004
GER & EU	43%	47%	45%	45%	46%	53%
GER	39%	37%	34%	38%	43%	31%
EU & GER	10%	10%	12%	10%	8%	10%
EU	6%	3%	6%	4%	6%	5%
Eurobarometer (EB): Spring 2002, Autumn 2002, Spring 2003, Autumn 2003, Spring 2004, Autumn 2004 ¹²⁷						

¹²⁶ Sabine Collmer et al., "All politics is local: Deutsche Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik im Spiegel der Oeffentlichen Meinung," *In: Harnisch, Katsioulis, Overhaus, Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik, Eine Bilanz der Regierung Schroeder*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004, 217.

¹²⁷ The Questions answered in Table 4 were not part of the Eurobarometers before or afterwards. Therefore the percentages show only the data's of the available years. See: European Commission, "Eurobarometer, Public Opinion in the European Union, No. 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62," *Umfragezeitraum 2001 to 2006*, http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/, (accessed May 1, 2007).

In general one can see that the Germans identify themselves more and more with the European Union. In total we can see that 94 % see themselves as Europeans, Germans and Europeans, or Europeans and Germans. A decline can be acknowledged in the importance of solely German identification during recent years whereas the European Union became more and more important concerning the issue of security and defense as well as in the area of personal identification.

D. CONCLUSION

The change in the global security environment forced both institutions, NATO as well as the EU, to change their strategic capabilities. A nationalization of the German security policy did not take part due to its willingness to cooperate through NATO and the European Union as well as its unwillingness to increase its defense expenditure. The agreements to enhance its capabilities within NATO and the EU are comparative. Germany as a member of the EU took over a significant lead in primary areas of transformation including strategic airlift, satellite intelligence, and combat search and rescue. The NATO attempt to increase the European capabilities was undertaken to enhance interoperability as well as to enable the Europeans to share a more equal burden in future conflicts. These capabilities have become well enhanced in the realm of the ESDP, and this has probably fostered a more independent European Security and Defense Policy. Concerning the German identification with a NATO, the EU, or a national defense identity one can observe that the European Union is favored by most Germans. Due to traditional sources of past discord as well as the mixed fortunes of U.S. policy in the present decade, the U.S. has lost a lot of its credibility in the European Union and especially in Germany. This fact furthermore fosters the pursuit for more independence. The Germans not only distrust NATO in its purpose and authority but also believe that the EU is the more trustworthy institution concerning security issues. Together with the broader realm of capabilities of the EU in peace building, NATO is under serious pressure to retain its status as the main security pillar in Europe. An evolution towards more civilian-military capabilities together with a Europeanization might ensure its survivability. With the results of the Eurobarometers in mind, one can hardly imagine

that a Europeanization of NATO is unavoidable. The EU developed as a backup institution for many European states, and enjoys a huge amount of legitimacy and trust within German society as well as among Europeans.

VI. CONCLUSION

After the Second World War, despite the horror of total war and genocide, by the final decades of the 20th century, a process of emancipation of Germany in the political realm can be observed. Its influence, particularly economic, grew through the years. Any independence was strictly avoided due to the threat of the Soviet Union towards the process of democratization within western Germany and because of the burden of national division into east and west. The transatlantic link was one of the major defense priorities of the Federal Republic of Germany, more important than reunification of Germany throughout the years of the Cold War. Surely this changed dramatically after the years of 1989 and 1990. Germany woke up from its *Doernroeschenschlaf* or sleeping beauty slumber, thereby facing tremendous internal problems to work through concerning its future position in the realm of western security. The external demand for a greater German role in conflicts like the second Gulf War 1990-1991 did not fit in the as of yet unformed defense identity of the German nation after reunification. From this phase of evolving and slowly developing national awareness one can see that national interests cannot be formed without a common national identity. Where the administration under Helmut Kohl made decisive commitments to maintain Germany integrated within NATO and to foster cooperation especially with the U.S., a change in trans-Atlantic paradigms can be acknowledged after Gerhard Schroeder took over the administration. Chancellor Helmut Kohl integrated the German armed forces even deeper in the transatlantic security community by establishing the German-American Brigade, the American-German Brigade, the German-Netherlands Corps, and the decision against the French attempt to get the NATO command post for the Mediterranean.

But all these decisions were made during the time when the reunification of Germany was the most important issue to German politicians. The ethnic cleansing of the Balkan Wars together with the pressure of the NATO members forced Germany to share the burden with its western allies to end the immoral acts happening in the Balkans. The lack of military capabilities was a traumatic experience for many of the European states which participated in the NATO-led war in the Balkans. However, this triggered the

British-French attempt to accelerate the development of a European Defense and Security Policy. As we have seen, different aims were at stake for Britain as well as for France. These developments pushed Germany to recognize that its geographic position, its economic power, and its historical experiences were issues of which other countries were far more aware, and demanding that Germany integrate into the European dimension of common security issues in future conflicts and wars. The ethnic cleansing during the Balkan Wars confronted Germany with a dilemma between consequences from the past and the shape of the future. The expectations of “never again war” and “never any German armed forces on foreign soils of Europe again” had governed the indefinite future. But politics could not diminish Germany’s moral role as one of the central powers of Europe. A question of morals and ethics finally forced Germany to participate in the common efforts of NATO to stabilize the region of central eastern Europe.

But with the ongoing process of a common European Defense and Security Policy a new era required that Germany had to find its place in this development. Competing loyalties could be observed in the fact that Germany, together with France and even outside the European Union tried to enhance the development of a more independent ESDP during the Schroeder administration. Surely the links to NATO continued to exist, but the realm in which the EU is willing to operate covers more than the aspects focused on by NATO. An institution developed, and still is in progress, which actually only lacks the military capabilities in order to be similar on one hand and even more advanced on the other hand to NATO. With the development of recent years a split in the preferences of different means and ends can be traced. A general split can be seen in the development that the Europeans and especially the Germans are very much in favor of diplomatic and civilized means to solve conflicts. A deep distrust of German society towards NATO, and especially the U.S., has developed over the past decades. Concerning issues of security, Germans do not trust NATO in general, and as evidence cited in the last chapter shows, the U.S. has lost a huge amount of credibility. Therefore, the Iraq war and the differences between George W. Bush and Gerhard Schroeder are not only an issue of a lack of sympathy but also a generational change in the German society. The increasing

identification with Europe together with the European military missions which are perceived as successful acknowledge an even deeper split between both sides of the Atlantic.

With the U.S. demand that the European nations should enhance their military capabilities to share a greater burden within NATO, a more equal say and more efficiency should be gained within NATO. As described in this thesis the development of NATO and the EU are very congruent in their attempt to increase their military capabilities. But this also could be seen as the opening of Pandora's Box. If these developments finally allow the Europeans to be more equal in military terms to the U.S., there might be no need to consider NATO as the only security institution to solve future conflicts. All developments of the European capabilities indicate that Europe is willing to develop its own security institution to operate more autonomously.

Taking this consideration together with the polls of the European Commission of the last seven years, as documented in the previous chapter, we become aware that a political change in NATO is necessary. Only if NATO is able to integrate the full spectrum of civil-military capabilities of the EU will it be able to reassert its influence. These issues are particularly relevant given the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The vision of German society shows clearly that an increasing identification with Europe is taking place, and further distrust of the actual Bush administration accelerates this development. A rift between support for soft- and hard-power is growing; in view of the experience of the Cold War, the common history, and the shared values on both sides of the Atlantic, this situation should be fixed immediately.

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